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Judicial Power and Moral Ideology
in Wartime: Shaping the Legal
Process in World War I Britain
Offering a cautionary lesson of contemporary significance, the
Article suggests that judicial power is not in and of itself the
solution to executive infringements on due process rights in
wartime. It examines the response of the British judiciary to
serious threats to its institutional power during the First World
War. To facilitate prosecution of the war, the government
narrowed the jurisdiction of the traditional courts by eliminating
jury trial, subjecting civilians to court-martial, and establishing
new administrative tribunals to displace the traditional courts.
Rather than remaining passive and deferential to the executive, as
scholars have generally assumed, the judges moved forcefully to
assert control over rival executive and military bodies. Even more
critically, they used their enlarged power to shape the legal process
in accordance with a distinctive moral ideology. Judicial wartime
decisions reflected not a neutral rule of procedural propriety but a
moral calculus that enhanced procedural rights for litigants who
advanced the war effort and curtailed them for those who
obstructed it. Thus, the Article generally argues that during the
war the judiciary aggressively pursued its institutional self-interest
and employed its resulting power to allocate procedural
entitlements in a manner that undermined the rule of law.
Understanding the role of the judiciary in this earlier conflict may
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Berkeley; M.A. 1968, Ph.D. 1975, Columbia University (History); J.D. 1979,
Harvard Law School. I would like to thank Edward A. Purcell, Jr. for his
invaluable suggestions and Juan Fernandez for his superb research support.
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encourage the heightened vigilance necessary to secure a full and
fair judicial process to all litigants in times of war.
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INTRODUCTION
n western democracies a state of war generally enlarges
executive power and erodes individual rights, and the
judiciary often emerges as the supposed guarantor of personal
freedoms and a fair legal process. Executive or legislative efforts
to curtail judicial power, such as the recent Military
Commissions Act' in the United States eliminating habeas
corpus jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees, raise concerns
about potentially unrestrained executive conduct. Britain during
World War I provides an interesting case study of the struggle
between different branches of government for control over the
legal process in wartime, and it offers two particularly significant
lessons. First, it illustrates that regardless of the formal legal
regime imposed by the government, judges have many tools at
their disposal to shape legal procedures and institutions to
promote their collective self-interest. Second, and more
significantly, it suggests that in wartime the judiciary will not
necessarily produce a procedural regime that fully protects due
process rights. On the contrary, the English experience during
this first global conflict demonstrates that an aggressive judiciary
may use its power not to secure a fair legal process but rather to
distort the rule of law.
Responding to the pressures of World War I, the British
government undertook a series of initiatives aimed at narrowing




the authority of the traditional courts. First, it constricted the
jurisdiction of the common law courts in both civil and criminal
cases. Its declaration of war in August 1914 transformed many
residents into enemy aliens with no right of access to the civil
courts; shortly thereafter it introduced emergency legislation
eliminating jury trial and vesting criminal jurisdiction over
wartime offenses in magistrates' courts and military tribunals.
Second, to expedite the adjudication of disputes in areas
essential to the war effort, including conscription and munitions
production, the executive created new administrative agencies
with specialized "judicial" functions. Third, the government
established new military courts in Ireland with competing
jurisdiction over civilians. This Article argues that the judges in
the traditional courts did not, as scholars have generally
assumed, passively acquiesce in these executive encroachments.2
In the sphere of legal procedures and institutions, no less than
that of substantive law,3 they responded to events quickly and
forcefully. They enlarged their jurisdiction over both civil and
criminal cases, insisted on a power of review over the new
administrative bodies, and asserted supremacy over rival military
courts. During World War I, in short, the British judiciary
buttressed and even amplified its institutional power.
This development, however, is only one part of a complex
story, as power must be used to a purpose. The other critical
2 See, e.g., K.D. EWING & C.A. GEARTY, THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES:
POLITICAL FREEDOM AND THE RULE OF LAW IN BRITAIN, 1914-1945, at 36 (2000)
(observing that during Word War I the judiciary was "compliant" to a "largely
unaccountable" executive); A.W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE
ODIOUS: DETENTION WITHOUT TRIAL IN WARTIME BRITAIN 6-7, 25 (1992)
(referring to the "strength of the British judicial tradition of faithfully supporting
the executive in cases involving security"); CHARLES TOWNSHEND, MAKING THE
PEACE: PUBLIC ORDER AND PUBLIC SECURITY IN MODERN BRITAIN 78 (1993)
(commenting on the "wartime complaisance of the judiciary"); DAVID WILLIAMS,
NOT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE PROBLEM OF SECURITY IN DEMOCRACY 187
(1965) (noting that in wartime the judges extended "considerable indulgence" to
the executive); George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by
National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 28 (1984)
(observing that in wartime the British courts "will not question the acts of the
government").
3 See Rachel Vorspan, Law and War: Individual Rights, Executive Authority, and
Judicial Power in England During World War 1, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 261
(2005) (arguing that through wartime rulings in cases involving individual
substantive rights, the judges vigorously pursued a particular institutional, political,
and moral agenda).
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element is that the judges directed their power to the service of a
particular objective: infusing the legal process with a moral
ideology adapted to the exigencies of military struggle. Beyond
preserving their institutional self-interest, the judges embedded
in the law a moral framework that they believed would facilitate
prosecution of the war. On issues of procedural as well as
substantive rights,4 judicial decisions reflected an implicit moral
consensus that litigants should enjoy rights based on their
perceived contributions to the national struggle. Wartime
decisions embodied not a neutral rule of procedural propriety
but a moral calculus that enhanced procedural entitlements for
litigants who advanced the war effort and curtailed them for
those who obstructed it. Accordingly, "undeserving" litigants
such as criminal defendants, draft evaders, and Irish rebels
received fewer procedural protections than "deserving" parties
such as munitions workers and "innocent" alien detainees.
Thus, this Article contends that the judges both aggressively
pursued their institutional self-interest during the war and
employed their resulting power to shape procedural rights
according to a distinctive set of wartime moral values.
Corresponding to these broader points, this Article is divided
into two parts. Part I describes the wartime challenges to the
traditional courts and demonstrates that the judiciary asserted its
authority by treating all potentially encroaching "judicial"
entities-magistrates' courts, administrative tribunals, and
military courts-as "inferior courts" equally subject to its
authority and oversight. Part II argues that the judges used their
institutional power to disseminate a bellicose wartime moral
vision, and it explores in particular the fate of three particular
groups of litigants: criminal defendants, enemy aliens, and
applicants before administrative tribunals.
The Conclusion suggests that to understand fully the judicial
role in wartime Britain, scholars must move beyond assessing the
judiciary's impact on "substantive" rights such, as personal
freedom and begin to examine the way judges applied
procedural rights contextually to achieve a new wartime balance
of institutional powers. Further, it offers the contemporary
4 See id. at 329-40 (arguing that in deciding cases involving substantive rights, the
World War I judges were driven by a moral ideology that differentiated among
litigants based on their perceived contribution to the war effort).
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lesson that elevating judicial over executive power is not in and
of itself necessarily the best mechanism for bolstering due
process rights in wartime. On the contrary, the experience of
World War I indicates that judges wielding power and driven by
a moralistic view of wartime imperatives can produce a
procedural regime woefully inadequate to provide a robust and
fair judicial process to all litigants.
I
WARTIME CHALLENGES AND THE ASSERTION OF JUDICIAL
INSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
During the First World War, the British government
challenged the authority of the traditional "superior ' , 5 courts in
three distinct ways: it narrowed their jurisdiction in civil and
criminal matters, created new administrative entities with
"judicial" features to handle specialized wartime problems, and
established military courts in Ireland with rival jurisdiction over
civilians. Far from acquiescing in these developments, the
judges fought successfully to bolster and accentuate their own
institutional power.
A. The Traditional Justice System: The Challenge of Diminished
Jurisdiction
The judiciary faced significant wartime challenges to its
authority in the spheres of both civil and criminal law. In the
civil arena the war deprived a significant segment of the
population of access to civil justice, while in the criminal domain
it led to the transfer of jurisdiction over wartime offenses from
common law to military and magistrates' courts.
1. Civil Procedure: Admitting Enemy Aliens to the Civil Courts
On August 4, 1914, by the simple act of proclaiming war, the
British government transformed a large segment of the foreign
5 This Article -uses the term "superior" courts to refer to the High Court
(containing the Divisional Courts of Chancery and King's Bench), the Court of
Appeal, and the House of Lords. These bodies are contrasted with "inferior"
courts such as magistrates' courts, courts-martial, and administrative tribunals,
which were not presided over by judges and were bound by superior court decisions
issued either on direct appeal or via the writs of certiorari, mandamus, prohibition,
and habeas corpus.
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67population into enemy aliens7 who under common law
precedent lost their right to bring civil lawsuits. The judges met
this challenge of diminished civil jurisdiction by altering the
common law to restore the excluded residents: in successive
stages they admitted enemy aliens to the courts as defendants,
allowed enemy aliens in Britain to sue as plaintiffs, and
permitted even enemy aliens in hostile territory to bring actions
in British courts.
a. Enemy Aliens As Defendants: Creating a Right to Appear in
the British Courts
Prior to the First World War, no case in English law directly
held that an enemy alien could be sued in the English courts.8 In
1915, however, the groundbreaking decision of Robinson & Co.
v. Continental Insurance Co.9 expressly opened the door to suits
against enemy defendants. The case involved an action by
British subjects to recover a loss under a policy of marine
insurance from a German insurance company operating in
Germany. The defendant firm claimed that as an enemy alien, it
could not be sued in the English courts for the duration of the
war. Mr. Justice Bailhache, however, fortified by an eighteenth-
century treatise and a series of American decisions, concluded
that to suspend a subject's right of suit against an enemy alien
would pointlessly injure British subjects. The reason for
precluding suits by enemy plaintiffs was that it was "contrary to
public policy for the Courts of this country to render any
assistance to an alien enemy,"' a rationale that obviously did
not apply in the case of alien defendants.
6 There were approximately 75,000 foreigners in Britain upon the outbreak of
war. See 76 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 24, 1915) 313; 83 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(5th ser.) (June 29, 1916) 1068-71; see also J.C. BIRD, CONTROL OF ENEMY ALIEN
CIVILIANS IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1914-1918, at 6-9 (1986); 1 JAMES WILFORD
GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR 73 (1920).
7 The term actually used during World War I was "alien enemy," but this Article
employs modern usage except where the term is directly quoted.
8 Lord Scrutton, a judge on the Court of Appeal, noted in a lecture delivered in
1918 that the point had not been decided until the war. T.E. Scrutton, The War and
the Law, 34 L.Q.R. 116, 123 (1918); see Robinson & Co. v. Cont'l Ins. Co., [1915] 1
K.B. 155, 159-61; Porter v. Freudenberg, [1915] 1 K.B. 857, 882 (C.A.).
9 [1915] 1 K.B. 155.
10 Id. at 159-60.
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Equally significant, the High Court further ruled that upon
being sued, an enemy alien had full rights to appear and defend
himself. Any other course "would be opposed to the
fundamental principles of justice," as not even a state of war
could "demand or justify the condemnation by a Civil Court of a
man unheard."" The full Court of Appeal approved Robinson
in Porter v. Freudenberg,12 agreeing that while suits against
enemy aliens would enable the King's subjects to enforce their
rights against the enemy, preventing an enemy alien from being
heard in his own defense "would be quite contrary to the basic
principles guiding the King's Courts in the administration of
justice., 13  This new rule, ostensibly showcasing English
principles of justice,1 4 also had the indisputable effect of
extending the jurisdiction of the traditional courts to a new
category of defendants.
b. Enemy Aliens As Plaintiffs: Creating a Right to Sue
The courts soon adopted an even more unprecedented and
aggressive stance, allowing enemy aliens not only to defend
themselves but also to sue as plaintiffs. If at the beginning of the
war enemy aliens had no access to the courts as defendants, a
11 Id. at 161. However, the court ruled that if the defense was successful, the
alien's right to receive costs would be suspended until the war was over. Id. at 162.
12 [1915] 1 K.B. 857 (C.A.).
13 Id. at 880, 883. Moreover, a defendant who lost a case had a right to appeal.
As the Court of Appeal stated in Porter, if the judgment went against the alien, "the
appellate Courts are as much open to him as to any other defendant." Id. at 883.
An enemy alien defendant was not, however, allowed to institute third-party
proceedings, for in so doing he came under the procedural disability of the enemy
alien plaintiff. See Halsey v. Lowenfeld, [1916] 2 K.B. 707 (C.A.) (holding that an
enemy alien could mount a defense but not initiate a third-party proceeding for
indemnification).
14 Justice also required that a defendant have actual notice of the action, but a
practical problem was serving process on enemy alien defendants. The German
government not surprisingly declined to allow service on its subjects in Germany.
See Scrutton, supra note 8, at 124. The Legal Proceedings Against Enemies Act,
1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1, instituted rules of substitute service to facilitate
English suits against enemy aliens. See Arnold D. McNair, Alien Enemy Litigants
11, 34 L.Q.R. 134, 141 (1918). Substituted service could be made on agents in
England or Holland where there was reason to believe that knowledge of the
proceedings would be transmitted to the principals in Germany. See Porter, [1915]
1 K.B. at 888; Scrutton, supra note 8, at 124. Lord Reading boasted in Porter that
English procedure was "laudably superior" to Continental law in not permitting
constructive service. [1915] 1 K.B. at 889.
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fortiori they could not be plaintiffs. Indeed, there was
substantial judicial authority to this effect. 15 As the Court of
Appeal pronounced in 1915, under the "ancient common law"'
16
an enemy alien "cannot sue or proceed in the civil Courts of the
realm.
, 17
Although the courts theoretically maintained this principle
throughout the war, in a series of deft legal maneuvers they
redefined the term "enemy alien" to exclude from its scope
anyone lawfully in Britain, including subjects of enemy states.
Adopting this stratagem early in the war, the courts declared
that the criterion for "enemy alien" status was henceforth to be
locality rather than nationality. The new test reconceived
"enemy alien" to mean a person of any nationality, even British,
who resided or worked in enemy territory. Conversely, the term
did not apply to persons of any nationality residing or working in
British, allied, or neutral territory. By reinterpreting the
meaning of "enemy alien," the judges extended civil jurisdiction
to everyone residentially or commercially domiciled in Britain.
Establishing this new concept of "enemy alien," the common
law courts in a remarkable series of decisions progressively
conferred on enemy subjects in the United Kingdom the right to
sue in tort, contract, property, and divorce. The first case,
Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Moffitt,18 was a defamation action
brought by a woman claiming to be the wife of a Hungarian
prince against another woman also presenting herself as the
prince's wife. The plaintiff had registered as an alien as required
by the Aliens Restriction Act 1914,19 and the defendant
15 The Privy Council ruled in Re Wilson, (1916) 113 L.T. 1116 (P.C.), that anyone
carrying on business in a hostile country must be treated as an alien enemy and that
"[n]o action will lie by or in favour of an alien enemy in the King's Court." Id. at
1116; accord Princess Thurn and Taxis v. Moffitt, [1915] 1 Ch. 58, 60; Porter, [1915]
1 K.B. at 873, 880 (C.A.); Arnold D. McNair, Alien Enemy Litigants I, 31 L.Q.R.
154, 159 (1915). The preclusion of enemy aliens from suit, however, was only to last
for the duration of the war: "The remedy is indeed suspended: an alien enemy
cannot sue in the Courts of either country while the war lasts; but the rights on the
contract are unaffected, and when the war is over the remedy in the Courts of either
is restored." Janson v. Driefontein Consol. Mines, Ltd., [1902] A.C. 484, 493 (H.L.).
16 Porter, [1915] 1 K.B. at 869.
17 Id. at 873.
18 [1915] 1 Ch. 58.
19 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1(1)(f). Registration was required of all aliens, and it




attempted to stay the proceedings on the ground that an enemy
alien had no right to sue. Mr. Justice Sargant acknowledged that
an enemy alien was generally not entitled to any relief at law as a
plaintiff in the English courts.20 But this particular plaintiff, he
noted, resided in the United Kingdom and had registered as an
alien, thereby obtaining a license to remain in the country.
Indeed, he proclaimed, the registration amounted to a
"command to the alien enemy not to depart.",21 Persons thus
allowed to remain were "under protection" and not subject to
the disabilities of enemies.
Later the same year, in Porter v. Freudenberg,22 the Court of
Appeal placed its imprimatur on this broad conception of civil
jurisdiction, confirming that registered enemy aliens in Britain
were not enemies for purposes of judicial access. The decision in
Princess Thurn, the court observed, was "clearly right,, 23 as the
test in wartime was not nationality but the place where a person
resided or carried on business. An enemy subject lawfully in
Britain, the court definitively established, was entitled to the
same rights as an English resident.24 Acknowledging that the
natural meaning of "alien enemy" was a subject of enemy
nationality, the court announced that such usage "is not the
sense in which the term is used in reference to civil rights., 25
The object of war was to cripple an enemy's commerce as much
as to capture its territory, the court reasoned, and British
subjects doing business in hostile territory were assisting the
26enemy to the same extent as subjects of enemy nationality. Incontrast, enemy subjects in Britain were under the King's
20 Princess Thurn, [1915] 1 Ch. at 60.
21 Id. at 61. In addition to being registered under section 1(1) of the Aliens
Restriction Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 1(1)(f), "under protection" meant
interned under either the ARA or the royal prerogative. See 1 GARNER, supra
note 6, at 119.
22 [1915] 1 K.B. 857.
23 Id. at 874.
24 Id. at 868.
25 Id. at 867.
26 Id. at 867-68. The court adopted a dictum of the House of Lords in Janson v.
Driefontein Consolidated Mines, Ltd., [1902] A.C. 484, 505-06 (H.L.), in which Lord
Lindley stated that "the subject of a State at war with this country, but who is
carrying on business here or in a foreign neutral country, is not treated as an alien
enemy."
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27protection, and the right to sue flowed from this protection.
The court thus conferred a right of judicial access on tens of
thousands of enemy aliens and ensured that English law would
control the disposition of their claims.
Applying the definition of enemy alien elaborated in Porter,
28the landmark case of Schaffenius v. Goldberg further enlarged
the rights of enemy subjects in Britain in two directions. First, it
extended the concept into commercial affairs by allowing enemy
aliens to bring cases in contract, which comprised the bulk of
litigation during World War I. Second, and far more
surprisingly, it brought even interned aliens within the scope of
the new rule.29
Schaffenius involved a German national who had resided and
carried on business in England for twenty-two years and who at
the outbreak of war registered as an enemy alien. In March 1915
Schaffenius entered into an agreement to finance a business in
picture moldings. Four months later he was interned, and the
picture molder rescinded the agreement on the ground that
Schaffenius was an enemy alien. Schaffenius sued, and the
defendant argued that internment operated as a revocation of
the plaintiff's protected status. The High Court concluded,
however, that the detainee plaintiff could still maintain his
action. Despite the internment, he was not an enemy: he was
not in enemy territory, and "[e]nemy character in a trading sense
ha[d] never attached to him., 30 Presenting a justification based
on English self-interest, the judge noted that precluding an alien
internee from suit would "leave him liable to fulfill all his
permitted transactions but powerless to enforce any of them, and
such a result would not only be ruinous to the plaintiff, but
27 Porter, [1915] 1 K.B. at 870-71.
28 [1916] 1 K.B. 284, affd, [1916] 1 K.B. 296 (C.A.).
29 In May 1915 the government undertook a campaign to intern subjects of
enemy states in Britain, see 71 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (May 13, 1915) 1841-42,
and it eventually detained more than 30,000 able-bodied men of military age, see 76
PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 24, 1915) 313; BIRD, supra note 6, at 8-9. The
internees comprised practically the entire enemy population. See 1 GARNER, supra
note 6, at 73, 127.
30 Schaffenius, [1916] 1 K.B. at 290. Mr. Justice Younger observed that though an
alien enemy plaintiff must prove that he was in the country with "license,"
registration was sufficient evidence of such a license and internment did not revoke
it. Id. at 294-95.
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speedily disastrous to all persons contracting with him.",31 Prima
facie all English residents were entitled to have access to the
courts, and internment was not only a form of residency but a
guarantee that the "command to the alien enemy not to depart"
32
would be obeyed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed that an enemy alien
interned as a civilian prisoner of war did not lose his contractual
rights. As the Master of the Rolls insisted, it was in accordance
with general principles of law that "the restraint which is
imposed upon the personal movements of an interned German
does not deprive him of civil rights in respect of a lawful
contract., 33 Another case decided the same year, Nordman v.
34Rayner, confirmed the new principle that internment did not
operate to destroy an alien's "civil rights.",35  Given that
practically the entire alien population was interned during World
War I, the effect of the ruling was to open the English courts to
virtually all enemy subjects in England.36
Taking a further step at the end of the war, the Court of
King's Bench expanded the causes of action available to alien
plaintiffs to include divorce. The plaintiff in Krauss v. Krauss37
was an Austrian domiciled in England and married to an
Englishwoman. When war broke out he applied for
naturalization, was rejected, and immediately registered as an
enemy alien. Soon thereafter he was interned, and while he was
under detention his wife committed adultery and gave birth to a
child. The court held that a registered alien could sue in the
English courts and that the civil actions open to him included
divorce.38
The courts did not restrict judicial access to aliens residing or
working in Britain but rather extended it to enemy subjects
domiciled or doing business in allied or neutral countries. As
noted earlier, only persons residing or working in enemy
31 Id. at 291.
32 Id. at 294-95.
33 Id. at 302.
34 (1916) 33 T.L.R. 87 (K.B.).
35 Id. at 88.
36 See 1 GARNER, supra note 6, at 127.
37 (1919) 35 T.L.R. 637 (Prob., Divorce & Adm.).
38 Id.
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territory were technically "enemy aliens," and by force of logic
enemy subjects in countries not at war with Britain did not fall
within the definition either. The Court of Chancery explicitly
endorsed this expansion of jurisdiction in Mary, Duchess of
Sutherland v. Bubna,39 a case involving three partners who
started a business in Paris before the war and subsequently sued
the Duchess of Sutherland's estate. At the time of the suit in
1915, two of the partners were French subjects living in Paris,
and the third, Siegfried David, was an Austrian subject
apparently domiciled in Spain. On the threshold question of
whether David was an enemy alien and therefore barred from
suit, Mr. Justice Warrington observed that since the test was not
nationality but rather the place of business, and since David was
neither residing nor working in an enemy state, the case could
40proceed. On appeal, the Court of Appeal reserved the
question of David's status until the trial because there was
uncertainty as to his actual residence, but it confirmed the rule
that an enemy subject in a neutral country could sue in the
English courts.4' Later in the war the House of Lords expressly
approved Duchess of Sutherland, endorsing the principle that
nationality was "no longer a test of alienage in the enforcement
of civil rights., 42  Thus, the judiciary skillfully dealt with the
removal of a sizeable segment of the population from its
jurisdiction by transforming the common law to return the
excluded element to its fold.
39 (1915) 31 T.L.R. 248 (Ch.).
40 Id.
41 Mary, Duchess of Sutherland v. Bubna, (1915) 31 T.L.R. 394, 395 (C.A.).
42 Rodriguez v. Speyer, [1919] A.C. 59, 135 (H.L.). Such an inclusive approach to
jurisdiction was also evident in Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 A.C. 262 (H.L.(I.)),
where the House of Lords allowed an Irish rebel to sue the Crown to recover
money seized from him during an arrest. The Lords found that the plaintiff, an
American citizen living in Ireland, was in the same position as a British subject even
though he was apparently guilty of treason. Relying on both Shaffenius and Porter,
Lord Atkinson observed that the fact that Pedlar had "shown himself unworthy of
the Sovereign's protection, has abused his privileges and violated his allegiance" did
not ipso facto terminate his right to sue. Id. at 285. The Crown had not withdrawn
its protection by trying him for high treason or expelling him from the country, and
mere internment did not operate as a revocation of his license to remain. Id. The
court concluded that the case could therefore proceed. Id. at 284-85.
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c. Enemy Subjects in Enemy Territory: Joining "True" Enemy
Aliens
The common law courts did not rest, however, with enlarging
their jurisdiction to reach enemy subjects in British, allied, or
neutral territory. Broadening judicial access still further, they
held that even enemy aliens under the revised definition-
persons residing or doing business in hostile countries-could
bring an action if doing so would benefit English commercial
interests. In Rodriguez v. Speyer Bros.,43 the House of Lords for
the first time allowed a German national to join a suit as a
coplaintiff on the ground that he was an indispensable party to
liquidating a partnership dissolved by the war. The Lord
Chancellor reasoned that if the British partners were unable to
join the enemy partner to recover a debt owed to the firm, the
company would not be able to secure its assets until the war was
over.44 To bar the enemy alien from serving as a plaintiff in the
action would thus harm British subjects more than it would
damage the enemy:
[T]here is no danger of the alien enemy's being enriched by the
proceedings, as none of the assets of the firm can be handed
over to him during the war. To apply the rule against suing to
such a case would be to inflict hardship not on the enemy but
on British and neutral partners .... [T]he question is whether
the rule does exist in a class of cases manifestly not within the
mischief at which the rule is aimed.
45
Concluding that it would be wrong to deny a British company
the right to bring an action for its own protection, the Lord
Chancellor relieved the enemy alien of his procedural
"disability" where his presence in the lawsuit was necessary to
benefit his British partners.46
Lord Haldane, embarking on a lengthy excursion through the
precedents, supported the Lord Chancellor's position by
pointing out that while the preponderance of authority treated
the preclusion of enemy aliens as a rigid common law rule rather
than as a matter of policy, the courts had not been unanimous on
43 [1919] A.C. 59 (H.L.).
44 Id. at 68. The English firm consisted of six partners, four of whom were
British, one an American, and one a German. Id. at 64-65.
45 Id. at 71.
46 Id. at 75.
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• 47this point. It was therefore open to the highest court to
examine the reason for the rule, and in his view "the balance of
public convenience is in favour of allowing the respondent firm
to get in this debt., 48  Lord Parmoor reached a similar
conclusion, discerning no inflexible rule of law that prevented an
enemy alien from suing as a coplaintiff. Applying such a rule in
the present case, he decided, would not disadvantage the enemy
but would rather deprive British subjects of property rights that
"they unquestionably possess."49  The House of Lords thus
treated rules ensuring access to justice as flexible rules of policy
rather than rigid rules of law in order to admit even "true"
enemy aliens to the civil courts.
In the course of the war, therefore, the judges transformed the
common law rules so that everyone lawfully in Britain could sue
or be sued, and even aliens in enemy territory could bring an
action if necessary to protect English commercial interests. In
Johnstone v. Pedlar,50 decided in 1921, the House of Lords
underscored the fact that these wartime jurisdictional changes
resulted solely from judicial rather than executive action. As
Lord Sumner declared, the "foundation of these rights of action
is that the Courts have defined their jurisdiction so as to admit
them, not that the Crown has granted a right of suit."5'
Taken collectively, the wartime decisions elevated judicial
access to the status of an "elemental" right. In 1920 the King's
Bench acknowledged this development in Chester v. Bateson,
which invalidated an emergency regulation prohibiting a
landlord from suing to recover property without the consent of
47 Id. at 84-85.
48 Id. at 86-87.
49 Id. at 136. The judges were split three to two, with Lords Atkinson and
Sumner dissenting. Lord Atkinson insisted that allowing a judicial tribunal to
disregard an established rule in a particular case would usurp the powers of the
Legislature. Id. at 90. In his view, the proposition that an enemy alien was
disqualified from suing only in actions where he would be enriched had "not a shred
of authority" in support. Id. at 92. Lord Sumner dissented on the ground that the
rule was unqualified-it had always been "as curt as the Commandments"-and
that if the enemy was a party to the action, a successful judgment would "enure
presently, if indirectly, to his material benefit." Id. at 117, 108.
50 [1921] 2 A.C. 262 (H.L.(I.)).
51 Id. at 291.
52 [1920] 1 K.B. 829.
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the Minister of Munitions.53 Mr. Justice Darling observed that
the regulation at issue "deprives the subject of his ordinary right
to seek justice in the Courts of law, '54 and he further insisted
that forbidding a litigant access to all legal tribunals could be
accomplished only by direct enactment of the legislature.55
Conceding that "in stress of war we may rightly be obliged, as we
should be ready, to forgo much of our liberty," he nonetheless
concluded that "this elemental right of the subjects of the British
Crown cannot be thus easily taken from them., 56 Mr. Justice
Avory echoed this view, proclaiming that under constitutional
law, a regulation establishing a precondition for bringing a civil
suit violated Magna Carta and the Bill of Rights.
As has been shown, the courts presented a number of
rationales for broadening civil jurisdiction, including promoting
trade, protecting property rights, assisting British subjects, and
simply "doing justice." Granting judicial access to hostile
subjects would facilitate commercial relations when peace was
restored, and enforcing a principle of evenhanded justice would
exhibit the moral superiority of the English legal system. In an
early plea to admit aliens to the British courts, the Solicitors'
Journal theorized that it was in the nation's self-interest for
judges to "perform their ordinary duties towards persons of all
nations." 58 As it explained in November 1914:
[It] cannot fail to produce a great moral effect if, while Europe
is submerged under a sea of cruelty and violence, justice is still
dispensed with even hand to all alike .... [T]he guns of both
sides now deal out indiscriminate destruction and slaughter in
all the area of war. But this will pass; peace will return; and
not a little will have been gained if, till that day, the courts of
Great Britain, like the courts of Germany, can stand as
emblems of peace amid the desolation of war.59
53 CONSOLIDATED REGULATIONS, DEFENCE OF THE REALM MANUAL, Reg.
2(A)2 (5th ed. 1918) [hereinafter DORA CONSOL. REGS.].
54 Chester, [1920] 1 K.B. at 834.
55 Id. at 833.
56 Id. at 834.
57 Id. at 836.
58 Civil Courts and War, 59 SOL. J. 67, 68 (Nov. 21, 1914).
59 Id. The article continued: "Business relations are not terminated, they are only
suspended .... [W]e entertain no doubt that the proper motto for the courts is
'Justice as usual.' Id. It was recognized that war was "inhuman and barbarous"
and should not be allowed to affect the procedures of civilian courts of justice. Id.
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These considerations coalesced in a judicial policy that, in
addition to advancing a variety of stated objectives, not
incidentally also extended the authority of English judges and
raised the stature of their courts.
2. Criminal Procedure: Restoring Jury Trial and Controlling
Courts of Summary Jurisdiction
Whereas in the civil sphere diminished superior court
jurisdiction flowed from common law rules that could be altered
by the judiciary at will, in the criminal sphere it resulted from
parliamentary action vesting jurisdiction over wartime offenses
in lesser judicial bodies. Here too the courts fought to reverse
the loss of authority, in this case by asserting a power of review
over the newly empowered entities. Though the decisions were
more circumscribed and less dramatic, the judges' impulse
toward institutional self-preservation was as evident in the
criminal as civil domain.
Successive incarnations of the Defence of the Realm Act
("DORA"), 60 enacted in the first few months of the war,
authorized the government to create by regulation a broad range
of national security offenses. In institutional terms DORA was
significant because it conferred jurisdiction over the new crimes
on summary magistrates' courts and courts-martial 61 rather than
traditional superior courts offering jury trial. The goal was to
speed up the hearing of criminal cases, reduce procedural rights
60 Defence of the Realm Act, Aug. 8, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29; Defence of the
Realm Act (No. 2), Aug. 28, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 63; Defence of the Realm
(Consolidation) Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8; Defence of the Realm
(Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34; Defence of the Realm
(Amendment) (No. 3) Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 42 (collectively known as
"DORA").
61 The first Defence of the Realm Act, passed on August 8, 1914, empowered the
government to authorize by regulation the trial by court-martial of persons who
breached regulations designed to "prevent persons communicating with the enemy"
or "secure the safety of any means of communication, or of railways, docks or
harbours." 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 1(a)-(b). A second act three weeks later extended
trial by court-martial to breaches of regulations issued to "prevent the spread of
reports likely to cause disaffection or alarm" or secure the safety of an area used by
the troops. DORA (No. 2), 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 63, § 1(a)-(b). The DORA
Consolidation Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(1), provided that the
government could by regulation "authorise the trial by courts-martial, or in the case




of defendants, and enhance available penalties.62  The
elimination of jury trial and loss of criminal jurisdiction
obviously threatened to undermine the status of the superior
court judiciary. Moving aggressively to restore their authority,
the judges used their legislative capacity to secure the
reinstatement of jury trial and their judicial capacity to control
the proceedings of magistrates' and military courts.
As members of the House of Lords, the judges pressed
forcefully for the restoration of trial by jury. During a debate
over DORA in the House of Lords in November 1914, Earl
Loreburn deplored the fact that the legislation placed "the life of
the British subject at the mercy of a military Court-Martial, even
though the Court of Assize may be sitting within fifty yards., 63
Similarly, Lord Parmoor insisted that there was no "precedent
for taking away the rights of a British subject as regards ordinary
trial by a jury directed by a skilled Judge."6 According to Lord
Bryce, the "constitutional protection of being tried by a civil
Court, 65 was "one of the oldest and most treasured parts of our
Constitution,, 66 while Lord Halsbury thought that there was "no
necessity for getting rid of the fabric of personal liberty that has
been built up for many generations.",67 Cowed by the vigor of
the judges' resistance, the government reversed its position. In
March 1915, claiming that such a drastic departure from
constitutional principle was no longer necessary,68 the Home
Secretary introduced legislation allowing defendants to elect jury
trial in the regular courts instead of court-martial. Critically, in
forcing the government to reinstate a fundamental right of
defendants, the judges at the same time protected their
traditional jurisdiction.
62 Where trial was by court-martial, for example, the accused was subject to the
death penalty if the offense was committed "with the intention of assisting the
enemy." DORA Consol. Act, Nov. 27, 1914,5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(4).
63 18 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Nov. 27, 1914) 207.
64 Id. at 210.
65 Id. at 209.
66 Id. at 695 (Mar. 11, 1915).
67 Id. at 208 (Nov. 27, 1914).
68 70 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 24, 1915) 288-89.
69 Defence of the Realm (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 1(1)
("Any offence against any regulations made under the Defence of the Realm
Consolidation Act, 1914, which is triable by court martial may, instead of being
tried by a court martial, be tried by a civil court with a jury ....").
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The restoration of jury trial, however, was limited and
primarily of symbolic importance. It was available only to
British subjects70 and could be abrogated by royal proclamation
in the event of "invasion or other special military emergency
arising out of the present war"71-a provision implemented in
Ireland in 1916 and again in 1920.72 Moreover, the restoration
had no effect on cases triable by summary proceeding, a
category that comprised the vast majority of DORA cases.73 In
practice, between courts-martial on the one hand and summary
proceedings on the other, few jury trials occurred during the war.
Indeed, in 1917 the National Council of Civil Liberties reported
that trial by jury had been "almost obliterated,, 74 contending
that between the "upper and nether millstones of court-martial
and summary jurisdiction," trial by jury was being "ground into a
smallness, if not with that slowness, which is usually attributed to
70 Neutrals or enemy aliens who committed offenses against the regulations
remained punishable under military law. Such cases could be transferred to a civil
court at the discretion of the prosecuting officer. Id.; see also Lindsay Rogers, The
War and the English Constitution, [1915] THE FORUM 27, 30.
71 DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 45, § 1(7). There were
also procedural burdens on the election of jury trial. The accused had to make his
choice within six days, id. § 1(2), and the use of a jury required the approval of the
Attorney General. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 56(11). If the
offender made no claim to jury trial, the case could be tried by court-martial unless
the Admiralty or Army Council instructed that it should not be. Id. Reg. 56(6)(b).
If a person entitled to jury trial failed to elect it, it was reversible error to provide it
to him. See R. v. Kakelo, [1923] 2 K.B. 793 (C.C.A.) (quashing a conviction because
a magistrate sent a case to quarter sessions without a request by the prisoner).
Finally, even in a jury trial the offender was liable to the punishment that could be
inflicted by a court-martial, with the possibility of a death sentence if an offense was
committed with the intention of assisting the enemy. DORA CONSOL. REGS, supra
note 53, Reg. 56A.
72 See infra text accompanying notes 176-91.
73 See DORA (Amendment) Act, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 45, § 1(2). A preference for
summary jurisdiction pervaded the regulatory scheme. Some offenses were
specifically vested only in courts of summary jurisdiction. See DORA CONSOL.
REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 56(2). Where a person was charged with other than a
summary offense, the competent naval or military authority was required to
investigate and determine whether the offense could indeed be dealt with by a court
of summary jurisdiction. Id. Reg. 56(3). If so, the offender was to be tried only
summarily. Id. Reg. 56(5). In a case scheduled for jury trial, the prosecution was
required to investigate it again to determine whether summary proceedings might
be adequate. Id. Reg. 56(7). The Director of Public Prosecutions determined the
forum for press and munitions offenses, id. Reg. 56(13)-(14); see Fox v. Spicer,
(1917) 33 T.L.R. 172 (K.B.), and the Director almost always chose summary trial.
See, e.g., "NORTH BRITON," BRITISH FREEDOM 1914-1917, at 50 (1917).
74 "NORTH BRITON," supra note 73, at 49.
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the mills of God., 75 Thus, the reinstatement of jury trial did not
eliminate the serious challenges posed to the judiciary by
magistrates' courts and courts-martial, and the judges dealt with
these threats by treating both bodies as "inferior courts" subject
to their review.
With respect to the magistrates' courts,76 two cases in
particular illustrated the vigorous exercise of superior court
control. The first case, Kaye v. Cole,77 limited the magistrates'
power over national security offenses to the duration of the war,
and the second, Norman v. Matthews,78 dictated procedures in
the magistrates' courts. Kaye involved an Oxford undergraduate
convicted in a magistrate's court of possessing antiwar posters in
violation of a DORA regulation. 79 The defendant appealed on
the ground that his prosecution was untimely under the
Summary Jurisdiction Act 1848,80 which required that a
summary prosecution be initiated within six months of the
offense. The King's Bench held that the magistrates derived
their powers over wartime crimes exclusively from DORA-an
act effective only for "the continuance of the present war 81 -
and declared the Summary Jurisdiction Act to be inoperative.82
As the Lord Chief Justice observed, the magistrates were able to
entertain the case only because the military authority, acting
under DORA, had selected a summary court as the appropriate
forum. "The jurisdiction is conferred by the regulations," the
court proclaimed, and was "not derived from the Summary
Jurisdiction Acts at all.",8 3 The import of the case was that the
75 Id. at 51-52.
76 The exercise of superior court. control over courts-martial is discussed infra
Part I.C.
77 (1917) 115 L.T. 783 (K.B.).
78 [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.).
79 Id. at 788. The regulation criminalized statements "likely to prejudice the
recruiting, training, discipline, or administration of any his Majesty's forces."
DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 27(c).
80 11 & 12 Vict., c. 43, § 11.
81 DORA, Aug. 8, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 1.
82 Kaye, 115 L.T. at 785.
83 Id. In contrast to the Summary Jurisdiction Act, a DORA regulation provided
that a defendant could be tried by a court of summary jurisdiction even if the
offense had been committed more than six months before institution of the
proceedings. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 56(6).
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King's Bench put finite limits on the newly expanded jurisdiction
of the summary courts.
The second case, Norman v. Matthews,84 demonstrated the
manner in which the superior courts shaped procedural rules
governing magistrates' courts, and it further indicated that in
determining the contours of summary jurisdiction, the wartime
judges were quite willing to flout executive policy. In 1916 the
police utilized a DORA regulation dealing with press offenses to
seize newspapers in the possession of C.H. Norman, a left-wing
journalist.85  Norman sued the Department of Public
Prosecutions to quash an order to destroy the documents, and a
magistrate dismissed his action in a private hearing. Norman
protested the fact that the hearing had been conducted in secret,
raising an issue of some significance since closed proceedings
were a common and controversial magisterial practice. 86 The
government was also troubled about the magistrates' excessive
use of this procedure. In 1915, for example, the Home Secretary
issued a circular urging magistrates to exercise this power with
"great care, 87 and he subsequently declared in Parliament that it
was important "to maintain the good practice of public trial as
far as possible." 88
Ignoring the government's position on public trials, the King's
Bench upheld the closure of the proceedings below on the basis
that a court has inherent authority to hear a case in camera if
"necessary for the proper administration of justice. '89
84 [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.).
85 Id. at 697.
86 See id. at 699 (Mr. Justice Sankey noting that in numerous recent cases heard
by the magistrates, hearings had been conducted in camera). The National Council
for Civil Liberties reported that magistrates generally acceded to a prosecutor's
demand that an entire case-not merely some part of the evidence-be heard in
camera. See "NORTH BRITON," supra note 73, at 54.
87 See 79 J.P. 596, 597 (1915). Two years later Lord Sheffield complained in the
House of Lords of the magistrates' "unreasonable use of the power of hearing cases
in camera" and their "indifferen[ce] to these pious hopes on the part of the
Secretary of State." 24 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (Mar. 7, 1917) 408-09.
88 75 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Nov. 4, 1915) 810. He also stated that "trial in
camera should only be resorted to in so far as national interests really demand." Id.;
see 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 23, 1916) 422-23.
89 Norman, [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. at 698. The court cautioned, however, that it
should not hear a case in camera lightly. To close the proceedings "is to take a very
exceptional course, and it is a jurisdiction which ought to be exercised with the
greatest care, and only upon the strongest grounds." Id. at 699.
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Significantly, the court could have reached the same result on
the basis of statutory and regulatory authority: both DORA and
Regulation 51A authorized in camera proceedings. 0 Instead,
however, the court chose to rely on inherent judicial powers. In
other words, judges displayed their independence by grounding
their decisions in common law authority rather than on any
powers vested in them by the executive or legislature. 9'
In instances where the courts necessarily construed emergency
statutes and regulations rather than relying on common law
analysis, the judges demonstrated their lack of subservience to
other bodies by rejecting positions espoused by the government,
the legislature, and the magistrates below. For example, in cases
involving the conscription of dual nationals, the High Court
ignored both parliamentary intent and magistrates' decisions
effectuating that intent by ruling that enemy aliens were subject
92to military service. The judges also discarded the
interpretations of magistrates and ministers in analyzing other
provisions of the Military Service Act.93  In addition, they
construed statutes to facilitate appeals from magistrates' courts
90 DORA (Amendment) Act, Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 1(3); DORA
CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, Reg. 51A.
91 In an earlier case, Ex parte Norman, (1916) 114 L.T. 232 (K.B.), Norman had
challenged Regulation 51A itself, which provided that proceedings challenging
confiscation of material by the police could be held in camera if the public interest
so required. The court concluded that the regulation was intra vires DORA,
emphasizing that since the magistrate had the power apart from regulation to hear
proceedings in camera, it followed that the regulation was not ultra vires. Id. at 234.
In other words, the court validated a DORA regulation on the basis of a
magistrate's preexisting common law power to hear cases in camera.
92 The Military Service Act 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 1(1), conscripted "[elvery
male British subject" of a certain age, and the British Nationality & Status of Aliens
Act 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 17, § 14, enabled any dual national upon reaching
adulthood to cease being a British subject. Magistrates often sensibly interpreted
the legislation to allow dual nationals to declare their alienage and avoid
conscription. See, e.g., Sawyer v. Kropp, (1916) 85 L.J.K.B. 1446, 1447; Dawson v.
Meuli, (1918) 118 L.T. 357, 359 (K.B.). However, the High Court disregarded clear
parliamentary intent in both statutes and insisted upon drafting enemy aliens into
the British Army. See Vorspan, supra note 3, at 288-93.
93 See, e.g., Towler v. Sutton, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 46 (rejecting the position of the
magistrate and the Crown that a recruiting officer's refusal to accept an affirmation
in place of a statement under oath from an atheist attempting to enlist was not a
"rejection" from military service); R. v. Burnham, (1918) 119 L.T. 308 (K.B.)
(rejecting the position of the magistrate and the Crown that the defendant had not
been interned by the enemy and was therefore liable to military service under the
Military Service Act).
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to higher courts, thereby ensuring the availability of superior
court review over summary court proceedings.94
The superior courts thus responded to the elimination of jury
trial and the concomitant rise of magistrates' courts by securing a
key statutory change with respect to jury trial, closely
supervising the proceedings of inferior courts, and rendering
decisions that underscored judicial independence. In the
criminal no less than the civil sphere, the courts responded to the
challenge of diminished jurisdiction by working assiduously and
successfully to restore their traditional authority.
B. Wartime Executive Tribunals: The Challenge of
Administrative Encroachment
A second wartime challenge to the authority of the traditional
courts emanated from the new executive agencies established by
the government to deal expeditiously with critical matters
affecting the war. The two primary wartime administrative
entities were the munitions tribunals to enforce the
comprehensive labor code established by the Munitions of War
Act 95 and the military service tribunals to decide applications for
96
exemption under the Military Service Act. These bodies posed
94 See, e.g., R. v. Campbell ex parte Moussa, [1921] All E.R. Rep. 499 (K.B.)
(finding a right of the defendant under the Summary Jurisdiction and Criminal
Justice Acts to appeal from a magistrate's court to a court of general or quarter
sessions). The courts also interpreted criminal statutes to confer expansive
jurisdiction on the English courts. See, e.g., R. v. Casement, [1916-171 All E.R.
Rep. 214 (C.C.A.) (interpreting the Treason Act 1351 broadly to reach Irish rebels
giving "aid and comfort to the King's enemies" in Germany rather than England).
95 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54; Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6
Geo. 5, c. 99; Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 45.
96 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104. There was also a third wartime administrative
agency, an Advisory Committee that gave advice to the Home Secretary on
internment and deportation orders. DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, Reg.
1.2. The Chairman of the Committee was required to be a person who "holds or has
held high judicial office," which meant a judge of the High Court or above. Id. Reg.
13. Two High Court judges each chaired a subcommittee. Sir John Sankey's
committee dealt with challenges to internment orders, while Sir Robert Younger's
dealt with deportation questions. Persons ordered interned or detained had seven
days to appeal, and after March 1916 they received a statement indicating the
grounds on which the order had been made. See 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
(Mar. 2, 1916) 1248. The function of the Committee was largely to give judicial
legitimacy to the government's internment and deportation decisions; in introducing
the body to the House of Commons, the Home Secretary referred to it as an
advisory body of a "judicial" character." See SIMPSON, supra note 2, at 16.
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a particular threat to the judiciary because the government
invested the tribunals with "judicial" features to enhance their
legitimacy. Utilizing judicial personnel and procedures, and
charged with the ordinary judicial tasks of interpreting statutes
and adjudicating disputes, the new agencies potentially
supplanted the regular courts. The judges responded by treating
these bodies as equivalent to magistrates' courts, dealing with
them as "inferior courts" that were part of the normal judicial
hierarchy and subject to superior court review. Although
scholars have assumed that such administrative entities relegated
the judiciary to a subsidiary role during and after the war,97 the
courts in fact energetically asserted control over these
potentially encroaching bodies and dictated their jurisdiction,
procedures, and substantive law.
1. Munitions Tribunals Under the Munitions of War Act
The Munitions of War Act98 ("Munitions Act") introduced a
detailed scheme for regulating munitions production during the
war. It banned strikes and lockouts, restricted labor mobility,
promoted labor discipline, and authorized replacement of skilled
workers with semi-skilled and female labor.99 Specific provisions
of the statute directed the government to prohibit companies
essential to armaments production from limiting productivity,
exceeding specified profit margins, or altering wages without
97 See, e.g., COLM CAMPBELL, EMERGENCY LAW IN IRELAND, 1918-1925, at 148
(1994) (discussing the diminution of the judicial role in British legal culture owing
to the grant of judicial and quasi-judicial powers to the executive); BARTON L.
INGRAHAM, POLITICAL CRIME IN EUROPE 292 (1979) (noting that Britain during
and between the wars was ruled by administrative regulations "practically free from
interference by the courts"); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW AND POLITICS: THE HOUSE
OF LORDS AS A JUDICIAL BODY, 1800-1976, at 196 (1978) (contending that in the
period from 1912 to 1940 "governments had few qualms in passing new functions of
government to bodies totally unrelated to the regular courts," thereby making the
courts "increasingly irrelevant"); TOWNSHEND, supra note 2, at 66 (discussing the
diminution of judicial authority after World War I); WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 188
(observing the decline of judicial in favor of administrative powers and stating that
'.[t]housands of administrative tribunals ... now exist-for decisions which the courts
have neither the time nor the technique to undertake").
98 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54.
99 See GERRY R. RUBIN, WAR, LAW AND LABOUR: THE MUNITIONS AcTS,
STATE REGULATION, AND THE UNIONS, 1915-1921, at 1 (1987); CHRIS WRIGLEY,
DAVID LLOYD GEORGE AND THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT 6-7 (1976).
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government consent."°  A particularly controversial clause
regulated the flow of labor by requiring munitions workers to
secure a "leaving certificate" from their current employer before
obtaining alternate employment.' 1 The Munitions Act also
empowered the Minister of Munitions to develop rules for
individual establishments dealing with such matters as sobriety,
diligence, and punctuality.
10 2
To enforce this scheme, the Munitions Act established special
industrial courts known as "munitions tribunals." Initially the
government proposed to use ordinary criminal courts for this
purpose, but the Labour Party, harboring longstanding
suspicions of magistrates and judges, 10 3 resisted this plan.
Conceding that it was not expedient to treat labor questions as
criminal law matters, the Home Secretary placated workers by
100 See RUBIN, supra note 99, at 16; WRIGLEY, supra note 99, at 110-21. A
contemporary summarized the basic scheme for the legislation as placing both
employers and workmen under the control of the government, supplanting strikes
and lockouts with a system of statutory arbitration, abrogating freedom of contract,
and allocating excess profits to the state rather than the employer. See THOMAS
ALEXANDER FYFE, EMPLOYERS & WORKMEN UNDER THE MUNITIONS OF WAR
AcTS 1915-1917, at 2-3 (3d ed. 1918).
101 If an employer refused the certificate, the worker was not permitted to work
for another employer for six weeks. Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c.
54, § 7(1); see GERD HARDACH, THE FIRST WORLD WAR, 1914-1918, at 188 (1977)
(noting that few workers could afford to forego wages for six weeks); Munitions
Tribunals, 31 JURID. REV. 152, 154 (1919) (commenting that no provision of the
Act was more disliked by workers). Workers particularly resented employers who
suspended workers without giving them leaving certificates in order to create a
reserve of labor in anticipation of new government contracts. See THE LABOUR
YEAR BOOK 1919, at 99 (1919) [hereinafter LABOUR YEAR BOOK]. The scheme
was so unpopular that it was abolished in October 1917. Id. at 104; see HARDACH,
supra, at 189.
102 See WRIGLEY, supra note 99, at 6-7.
103 See 4 HISTORY OF THE MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, PART II: THE
REGULATION OF LABOUR 11 (1918) [hereinafter HISTORY]; WRIGLEY, supra note
99, at 112; G.R. Rubin, The Origins of Industrial Tribunals: Munitions Tribunals
During the First World War, 6 INDUS. L.J. 149, 153 (1977). According to Arthur
Henderson, President of the Board of Education, munitions tribunals were created
because the government desired "not to have the men taken before the magistrates
and to feel possibly that they were not getting their cases considered always by men
of a more sympathetic nature." 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (July 1, 1915) 2079.
On labor hostility to the judiciary in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, see Rachel Vorspan, The Political Power of Nuisance Law: Labor




agreeing to establish more appropriate "domestic" bodies."1 4
The government created two types of munitions tribunals: ten
"general" tribunals to deal with major offenses under the act,
such as striking or poaching employees from competing firms;
and fifty-five "local" tribunals to handle routine matters, such as
employers denying leaving certificates or workers infringing
work rules. 10 5 Both general and local tribunals consisted of a
chairman and an even number of lay "assessors," half of whom
represented employers and half employees. 10 6  By December
1915 the tribunals controlled more than a million workers in
Britain.'0 7 In their first year of operation, they heard more than
21,000 cases, 354 in the general tribunals and the remainder in
the local tribunals. 10
8
The tribunals presented a special threat to the judiciary
because they possessed features that conveyed "judicial"
legitimacy even as these entities remained distinct from the
ordinary courts. Their judicial character was evident in their
personnel, structure, and procedures. Eminent members of the
104 Sir John Simon, the Home Secretary, declared that the object was to secure
"something in the nature of a domestic tribunal. You do not want to carry the
workmen, or the employer either, in a matter of this sort before a Police Court in
order to deal with it as if this was a criminal matter." 72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.)
(June 28, 1915) 1548. Similarly, Arthur Henderson stated that the government
wanted to "take all the cases right away from the Police Court" and have them dealt
with by a "domestic court." Id. at 2077-78 (July 1, 1915); see id. at 1550, 1588; see
also De Minimis, 34 LAW NOTES 321, 322 (1915).
105 See HISTORY, supra note 103, at 12; RUBIN, supra note 99, at 2; Munitions
Tribunals, supra note 101, at 153-54. Whereas the general tribunals could deal with
all offenses, impose fines, and in some circumstances imprison offenders, the local
tribunals dealt only with offenses for which the maximum fine did not exceed five
pounds. Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(1).
106 Munitions of War Act, 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54, § 15(1). The Munitions of
War Amendment Act 1916 provided for the appointment of a woman assessor in
cases involving a female worker. 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(2)(b). The Act also
required the chairman to consult the assessors before giving his decision; if they
were unanimous, he was bound by their opinion except on questions of law. Id. §
18(2)(a).
107 See Chris Wrigley, Introduction, in CHALLENGES OF LABOUR: CENTRAL AND
WESTERN EUROPE 1917-1920 1, 7(Chris Wrigley ed., 1993). In 1918, 3.4 million
workers were involved in munitions work and more than two million were
employed in controlled establishments. See Rubin, supra note 103, at 162.
108 See LABOUR YEAR BOOK, supra note 101, at 106; Rubin, supra note 103, at
162. The general tribunals heard a comparatively small number of cases since they
could not hear cases within the competence of a local tribunal unless the matter wa.s
referred to them by the Ministry of Munitions. See LABOUR YEAR BOOK, supra
note 101, at 105.
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bar, generally King's Counsel, presided over the general
tribunals, while solicitors, coroners, barristers, and justices of the
peace chaired the local bodies. 09 Magistrates' clerks, familiar
with procedures in courts of summary jurisdiction, acted as
tribunal clerks."0 The tribunals also emulated the courts in
utilizing an adversarial system: employers and employees could
lodge complaints against one another, and the Minister of
Munitions could bring a prosecution against either side."' Cases
112were to be tried in open court, and a tribunal could not fine a
person unless he or she had either appeared before the tribunal
113or had a reasonable opportunity of so appearing. Counsel
were permitted in the general tribunals though not in the local
tribunals out of fear that legal representation would put workers
at a disadvantage." 4  The Minister of Munitions promulgated
rules requiring a complaint to be in writing115 and allowing, but
not requiring, evidence to be taken under oath. 116 This quasi-
judicial structure posed a challenge to the regular courts because
it suggested that they were unnecessary for either the
interpretation or enforcement of wartime legislation.
Judicial review had not been part of the original
administrative scheme, but labor quickly became dissatisfied
109 See Munitions Tribunals, supra note 101, at 152; Rubin, supra note 103, at 154.
110 See HISTORY, supra note 103, at 11; Munitions Tribunals, supra note 101, at
153. This feature was helpful because prosecutions by the Minister of Munitions
were governed by the Summary Jurisdiction Act regarding compelled attendance of
defendants and witnesses, the payment and recovery of fines, and the execution of
service between one part of the British Isles and another. MUNITIONS
(TRIBUNALS) RULES, 1917, R. 11, reprinted in FYFE, supra note 100, at 147-56
[hereinafter TRIBUNAL RULES].
111 See RUBIN, supra note 99, at 138-44; Rubin, supra note 103, at 153-59.
112 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 13.
113 Id. R. 11(iii); see id. R. 12(ii).
114 Id. R. 16; see also Rubin, supra note 103, at 158; De Minimis, supra note 104,
at 321-22. Trade union representatives often appeared on behalf of their members.
See TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 16; HISTORY, supra note 103, at 12;
Rubin, supra note 103, at 158.
115 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 8. In order to maintain the domestic
character of the tribunal, a summons to attend could be made by registered letter
rather than by a police officer. See HISTORY, supra note 103, at 12.
116 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 1OA; see Kinder v. Delta Metal Co.,
(1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 46, 50 (noting that the usual procedure was not to hear
evidence under oath). Under the Munitions of War Act 1915, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 54, §
15(3), the Home Secretary issued rules to be followed in penal offenses and the
Minister of Munitions promulgated rules involving any other matter.
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with the munitions tribunals. Despite the government's
intention to create "domestic" bodies, the tribunals acquired the
aura of a criminal court. Hearings often took place in a law or
even police court where, as an official investigator reported,
there was "an objectionable criminal atmosphere.' '1 17  It only
exacerbated the unpleasantness that police were frequently
summoned to maintain order.118  In addition to resenting the
oppressive setting, workers and unions complained that tribunal
rulings were arbitrary, inconsistent, and biased against them." 9
Statistics indeed bore out the claim that employees were
prosecuted far more often than employers and convicted at a
120much higher rate. In the face of mounting complaints, the
government decided to insert into the administrative scheme a
formal layer of judicial review. Accordingly, in January 1916
Parliament amended the Munitions Act to provide a process for
117 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRIAL
UNREST IN GREAT BRITAIN 93 (1917) [hereinafter INDUSTRIAL UNREST]; see also
id. at 91, 112; Rubin, supra note 103, at 156. As the National Council for Civil
Liberties proclaimed, the tribunals, if not courts in name, were "courts in the
essential fact." "NORTH BRITON," supra note 73, at 66.
118 Rubin, supra note 103, at 156.
119 See, e.g., INDUSTRIAL UNREST, supra note 117, at 91-92; LABOUR YEAR
BOOK, supra note 101, at 97 (citing widespread dissatisfaction by unions with
arbitrary tribunal decisions); G.R. Rubin, The Munitions Appeal Reports 1916-1920:
A Neglected Episode in Modern Legal History, 1977 JURID. REV. 221,222. Another
investigator reported that the tribunals were considered "peculiarly obnoxious" by
workers, who found it difficult to distinguish them from a police court and resented
the stigma. Similarly, an investigator reported that "[i]n normal times the employer
disciplines his own men, now discipline is enforced publicly in a criminal court."
INDUSTRIAL UNREST, supra note 117, at 91.
120 In the period between July and November 1915, 589 workers were prosecuted
for striking and 407 of them were convicted; charges were also brought against 3074
workers for breaches of work rules, 2012 of whom were convicted. In the case of
employers, fifty-five were convicted of illegally employing workers without a
leaving certificate, and-there was one failed prosecution of an employer for locking
out his employees. In the same period, the tribunals granted 782 leaving certificates
and rejected 1343. MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, RETURN OF CASES HEARD BEFORE
MUNITIONS TRIBUNALS, 1915, Cd. 8143, at 2. From November 1915 to July 1916,
there were 1023 prosecutions of striking workers, 599 of whom were convicted, and
there were 12,004 complaints of breaches of rules of controlled establishments
resulting in the conviction of 8633 workers. The same period saw no prosecutions
of employers for lock-out violations and only 115 charges, yielding 71 convictions,
of employing workers without a certificate. The tribunals granted 3225 leaving
certificates and refused 5185. MINISTRY OF MUNITIONS, RETURN OF CASES
HEARD BEFORE MUNITIONS TRIBUNALS, 1916, Cd. 8360, at 2; see also LABOUR
YEAR BOOK, supra note 101, at 106-07.
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appealing tribunal decisions to special divisions of the High
Court for England and Wales, Ireland, and Scotland. 2'
The High Court judges made the most of their opportunity.
They vigorously asserted their power of review over the
administrative tribunals, treating them as inferior courts and
determining both their law and procedures. In rendering
substantive decisions, the High Court judges construed the
Munitions Act to resolve many important issues of national
122policy: the scope of the statute, the rate of wages payable to
123
workers, the standards for issuing or withholding leaving
124
certificates, the rights of unions and striking workers under the
regulatory scheme, 25 and the conditions under which an
employee could be discharged for misconduct. 26  The High
121 Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(3).
Superior court review of tribunal procedures was especially important because at
the trial level the tribunals had exclusive jurisdiction over most claims arising under
the Munitions of War Acts. See Hulme v. Ferranti, Ltd., [1915] 2 K.B. 426. High
Court proceedings were more formal than tribunal proceedings but differed from
ordinary proceedings by following a simple and expeditious procedure and assessing
low fees. Appeals were conducted by counsel, though on occasion the judge
allowed trade union officials to appear. See Rubin, supra note 103, at 159 (quoting
H. WOLFE, LABOUR SUPPLY AND REGULATION 113 (1923)).
122 The court determined, for example, what firms qualified as "controlled
establishments" and what types of employees were entitled to protection against
dismissal without notice. See, e.g., Mayne v. Micanite & Insulators Co., (1916) 1
Mun. App. Rep. 1; Shaw v. Lincoln Waggon & Engine Co., (191.6) 1 Mun. App.
Rep. 11; Briggs v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 43; Rawnsley
v. Bradford Dyers Assoc., Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 103; Foden v. Jacquet-
Maurel & Condac, Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 237; Perris v. Wolseley Motors,
Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 48.
123 Collins v. Brazil, Straker & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 27; Curnock v. J.
Butler & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 52; Perris, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 48;
Morris v. Rudge-Whitworth, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 107; Scott v. MacLellan,
(1919) Scot. Mun. App.. Rep. 182.
124 See, e.g., Bennett v. King's Norton Metal Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 114;
Acme Steel & Foundry Co. v. Stafford, (1917) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 53, 54; Stierlin
v. Gen. Stores & Munitions Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 124; Gane v. Rees
Roturbo Mfg. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 129; Padgett v. Richard Hornsby &
Sons, Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 137; Knowles v. Ollersett Collieries Co., (1916)
1 Mun. App. Rep. 63; Taylor v. Samuel Osborn & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep.
163; Dodds v. J.L. Thompson & Sons, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 63; Bayliss v.
Worsey, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 68.
125 See, e.g., Guillet v. E.H. Bentall & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 86; George v.
Larne Shipbuilding Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 82; Morris, (1917) 2 Mun. App.
Rep. 107; Orr v. Beardmore & Co., (1917) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 99.
126 See, e.g., Payne v. Brazil, Straker & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 223; Nat'l
Projectile Factory v. Fagan, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 75; Kilby v. Chief
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127Court established uniform binding rules on all these matters,
frequently reversing the decisions of the munitions tribunals for
incorrectly interpreting the statutory requirements.18
Even more significant than reversing tribunal judgments, the
High Court judges not infrequently decided against the
government, demonstrating their intention to shape national
munitions policy on their own distinctive terms.129  In
Whittingham v. New Liverpool Rubber Co., 130 for example, the
High Court expanded statutory protection for workers over the
objections of both the Minister of Munitions and the employer.
Whittingham, a packing employee, complained that he had been
summarily dismissed without receiving compensation that the
Act mandated. The employer countered that Whittingham was
not covered by the legislation because he had spent only twenty
percent of his time packing military goods. The Minister had
previously circulated a memorandum interpreting the Munitions
Act to apply only to workers engaged in "substantial" munitions
work, and twenty percent was arguably inadequate to satisfy this
Superintendent of Ordnance Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 121; Lane v. Chief
Superintendent of Ordnance Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 117; Rodgers v.
Menzies & Co., (1917) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 83.
127 Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 18(3).
128 See, e.g., Mayne v. Micanite & Insulators Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 1;
Shaw v. Lincoln Waggon & Engine Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 11; Curnock,
(1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 52; Sandberg v. A.D. Dawnay & Sons, (1916) 1 Mun. App.
Rep. 70; Guillet, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 86; Abbott & Rea v. Cammell, Laird &
Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 199; Taylor, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 163; Norris v.
Lancashire Dynamo & Motor Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 98.
129 Judicial independence was also evident in the decisions of the Internment and
Deportation Advisory Committee, see supra note 96, which more often than not
reversed the Home Secretary's determinations. The Sankey internment
subcommittee held its first meeting on May 27, 1915, and sat on forty occasions
during the next two months, considering 14,117 challenges to internment orders.
Though the burden was on the alien to show why exemption was warranted, the
committee granted 6092 applications and held another 1233 for further
consideration. In the following seven months, the subcommittee dealt with an
additional 2076 applications, recommending favorably on 1211. See BIRD, supra
note 6, at 96. Viscount Cave pointed out in February 1917 that nearly all the 20,000
aliens still at liberty had been recommended for exemption by the Advisory
Committee. Id. at 118. Though critics complained that the Committee had no real
power-it was appointed by the government, could be instantly dismissed by the
government, and could not insist on a person's release, see "NORTH BRITON," supra
note 73, at 61-the government insisted that the Committee's advice was always
followed, see 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Mar. 2, 1916) 1247; see also BIRD,
supra note 6, at 97.
130 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 98.
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standard. Mr. Justice Atkin, however, noting that his view
differed significantly from that of the Minister, concluded that
the statute applied in Whittingham's case.' 3 1 He pointed out that
it merely required that an employee work "on or in connection
with munitions work," interposing no such qualification as
"substantially employed., 132
Similarly, the judiciary reached decisions independent of the
government on the appropriate wage rate for workers,
repeatedly announcing that such a critical matter was its own
responsibility and not that of the Minister of Munitions. In
Collins v. Brazil, Straker & Co.,133 for example, four employees
in Bristol charged their employer with reneging on a promise to
pay them a particular wage. The employer's defense, backed by
the Minister of Munitions, was that the employees were
receiving exactly the salary that the Ministry had authorized,
which was less than the sum agreed upon between workers and
employer. Mr. Justice Atkin declared that the amount of
remuneration was not for the Minister to decide: the worker
need only satisfy the court, not the Minister, of the wages to
which he was entitled.134 Similarly, other rulings on the merits
departed from the stated policy of the Minister of Munitions. 3 5
Revealingly, while the judges readily rejected the position of
the government, they were deeply reluctant to eschew their own
precedents. Where common law rules arguably factored into the
analysis, the courts invariably treated them as dispositive. For
131 Id. at 106.
132 Id. at 104.
133 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 27.
134 Id. at 40.
135 See, e.g., Briggs v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 43
(rejecting the Minister's position that repairing navy locomotives was not
"munitions work" within the meaning of the Act); Curnock v. J. Butler & Co.,
(1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 52 (rejecting the Minister's view of the applicability of an
agreement between employers and unions in determining the rate of wages);
Rawnsley v. Bradford Dyers Ass'n, Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 103 (rejecting
the Minister's view that a worker was not engaged in munitions work and therefore
not entitled to compensation in lieu of notice upon dismissal); Cook v. Haslam
Foundry & Eng'g Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 8 (rejecting the Minister's policy
-that it was not generally in the national interest for a man to change his
employment to obtain overtime work); Lane v. Chief Superintendent of Ordnance
Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 117 (rejecting the Minister's contention that an
employee was guilty of misconduct for being under the influence of alcohol).
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example, in Payne v. Brazil, Straker & Co.,"' the court rejected
an employee's claim of unjust dismissal in light of a restrictive
common law rule allowing an employer to dismiss a worker for
misconduct even if the misconduct was unknown to the
employer at the time of discharge. The worker argued that the
common law rule did not apply to claims under the Munitions
Act, 37 but the court concluded otherwise. Similarly, in Hinchley
v. A. V. Roe & Co.138 the court relied on a common law rule to
deny a claim of wrongful discharge brought by workers who had
mistakenly remained on the job while filing their complaint.13 9
These decisions adverse to labor were at odds with the High
Court's generally sympathetic stance toward workers, suggesting
that institutional loyalty was a paramount factor in determining
substantive judicial results.
In addition to deciding the legal rules that the tribunals would
apply, the courts also controlled the procedures that would
govern. For example, operating within the parameters set by
regulation, the High Court issued specific rulings with respect to
the form of the complaint. 40 It further determined evidentiary
requirements, establishing that testimony under oath was
unnecessary since munitions tribunals were "emergency Courts"
that administered justice "in very difficult circumstances, and
with all possible speed.' 14' Frequently, the High Court
demonstrated its lack of deference to the government by
136 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 223.
137 Id. at 225. The position of the worker was that the employer could only rely
on the actual ground for dismissal. Id.
138 (1919) 3 Mun. App. Rep. 50..
139 Nonetheless, the judge suggested in dicta that the employers had probably
breached the contract of employment and that the workers might have a remedy in
damages. Id. at 57-58; see Gorman v. Luke & Spencer, Ltd., (1919) 3 Mun. App.
Rep. 59 (ruling in favor of the employer on common law principles but again
suggesting that the employer might have breached the contract of employment);
Morgan v. Fraser & Chalmers, Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 109 (holding that the
amount owed a worker in compensation for dismissal without notice must be
determined on common law damages principles); see also Hoyle v. Harland &
Wolff, Ltd., (1918) 3 Mun. App. Rep. 18; Acme Steel & Foundry Co. v. Fulton,
(1919) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 186.
140 See G. Inglis & Co. v. Walker, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 10; Swales v.
Great E. Ry. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 189; Shelton Iron, Steel & Coal Co. v.
Hassall, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 208.
141 Scottish Tube Co. v. M'Gillivray,. (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 16, 17. The
judge noted, however, that more formality was required if the case involved a
penalty. Id. at 18.
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disagreeing with the Minister of Munitions as to the requisite
procedures.
142
The superior courts exercised control over the munitions
tribunals not only through their statutory power of review but
through a more traditional channel as well. Refusing to view the
statutory appeal procedure as ousting their ordinary jurisdiction,
the courts also exercised oversight over the tribunals via the
prerogative writs. In R. v. Newcastle Munitions Tribunal ex parte
Lloyd George,43 the King's Bench affirmed that it had the same
power to review a tribunal that it enjoyed over an inferior court.
The case involved a munitions tribunal that refused to entertain
a complaint from the Minister of Munitions about ship workers
who rejected an instruction to work overtime. The Divisional
Court granted a writ of certiorari directing the tribunal to show
cause why it declined to hear the case. Calling attention to this
decision, the Law Journal found it noteworthy that the High
Court characterized the munitions tribunals as inferior courts
whose exercise of jurisdiction it could regulate.'" The case was
decided in November 1915, only three months after passage of
the statute authorizing the tribunals. Obviously, the courts had
acted quickly to assert over these bodies their traditional as well
as special powers of supervision.
2. Military Service Tribunals Under the Military Service Act
The "judicial" character of wartime administrative bodies and
the consequent threat they presented to the traditional courts
was equally pronounced in tribunals established to adjudicate
claims for military exemption. Introducing conscription for the
first time in British history, the Military Service Act of 1916145
excused persons in certain categories. An individual could
obtain a waiver from military service if he worked in an essential
occupation, was a conscientious objector, or suffered from ill-
142 For example, in Shelton, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. at 214, the court rejected
the position of the Minister that the ground of the complaint need not be stated,
and in Binns v. Nasmyth, Wilson and Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 169, it held that
the employer was not required to give notice of a change in working conditions in
the form prescribed by the Minister of Munitions.
143 (1915) 50 L.J. 530 (K.B.).
144 Id. at 530.
145 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104.
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health or other hardship. The Act established local bodies of
between five and twenty-five persons to hear and determine
requests for exemption certificates.
14 7
Like the munitions tribunals, the military service tribunals
boasted "judicial" features. First, they were composed of men
who-possessed legal and often judicial training. Describing the
functions of the local tribunals as being "of a judicial nature," 148
the department responsible for setting up the tribunals sought
people who would "give full and fair consideration" to the
cases.14 9  As a result, magistrates and inferior court judges
constituted a large proportion of the tribunal membership.
150
Second, the tribunal process, in the words of a contemporary,
was "modelled on that of a law court.' 151 It basically consisted of
an adversary system pitting the applicant for exemption against
an Army emissary known as the military representative. The
representative, who had a right to appear as a party and
functioned as the prosecutor, had informal counsel in the form
of an advisory committee. 152 His role was controversial since
146 Id. § 2(1)(a)-(d).
147 Id. § 2(1), sched. 2 § 1.
148 See JOHN RAE, CONSCIENCE AND POLITICS: THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT
AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR TO MILITARY SERVICE, 1916-1919, at 54
(1970).
149 Id. at 53.
150 See JOHN W. GRAHAM, CONSCRIPTION AND CONSCIENCE: A HISTORY 1916-
1919, at 65 (1922); RAE, supra note 148, at 57.
151 Adrian Stephen, The Tribunals, in WE DID NOT FIGHT: 1914-18
EXPERIENCES OF WAR RESISTERS 377, 378 (Julian Bell ed., 1935). Unlike the
munitions bodies, whose procedures were dictated in part by regulation, the
military service tribunals wholly determined the applicable process themselves.
Under the Military Service Act 1916 the government was empowered to regulate
the tribunals, and insofar as it did not do so, the procedure of the tribunal "shall be
such as may be determined by the tribunal." 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, sched. 2, § 5. The
government did not promulgate any regulations establishing procedures, leaving the
tribunals free to determine their own. The procedures adopted were generally
consistent from tribunal to tribunal. See RAE, supra note 148, at 99.
152 The War Office appointed an advisory committee in each district to scrutinize
the applications and instruct the military representative as a solicitor instructs
counsel. The committee often interviewed applicants prior to the tribunal hearing.
Lytton Strachey provided one account of such an interview. He appeared as a
claimant for exemption before his local advisory committee in March 1916 but was
not allowed to argue his case, as the committee maintained that it existed only to
give advice to the military representative. The committee members listened to him
politely but at the end informed him that they would recommend that the tribunal
grant "no relief." 2 MICHAEL HOLROYD, LYTTON STRACHEY: A CRITICAL
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many tribunals allowed him to sit among the members and even
preside over the hearing.15 3  Nonetheless, the government
defended the position as necessary to a full-fledged adversary
proceeding. As the Under-Secretary of State for War declared
in the House of Commons, since the business of the tribunal was
"to exercise judicial functions," it.was essential that the military
case be "fully and properly presented.'
154
During the hearing the applicant was entitled to be
represented by counsel or a friend, though in practice legal
representation was rare. 55  Tribunal sessions were generally
public, and both the applicant and military representative were
allowed to make opening statements and to examine and cross-
examine witnesses. 5 6 Like the munitions tribunals, the military
service tribunals employed more informal procedures than a
regular court. They could admit hearsay and opinion evidence
and were not required to hear testimony on oath. 15 7 Another
judicial feature of the tribunal system was its elaborate appellate
structure: parties could appeal as of right to an Appeals Tribunal
BIOGRAPHY 176-77 (1968). The National Council of Civil Liberties bitterly
opposed the role of the advisory committees in interviewing claimants,contending
that this practice was an "entirely illegal attempt to insert a military board between
the legal tribunal and the claimant." "NORTH BRITON," supra note 73, at 69.
153 See RAE, supra note 148, at 17-18, 102; PHILIP SNOWDEN, BRITISH
PRUSSIANISM: THE SCANDAL OF THE TRIBUNALS 7-8 (1916); Lois Bibbings, State
Reaction to Conscientious Objection, in FRONTIERS OF CRIMINALITY 57, 64 (Ian
Loveland ed., 1995); Stephen, supra note 151, at 379. It was difficult for tribunal
members to resist a view expressed by both the military representative and his
advisory committee. See RAE, supra note 148, at 17-18.
154 Quoted in THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF CONSCRIPTION IN GREAT
BRITAIN 185 (Richard C. Lambert ed., 1917). The Under-Secretary added that it
was "the duty of the local military and recruiting authorities to place the facts
completely before the tribunals just as much as applicants for exemption are
entitled to state their case fully." Id.
155 See RAE, supra note 148, at 99-100. The President of the Local Government
Board instructed the tribunals to discourage counsel, and pacifist organizations
advised their members not to be represented by a friend and certainly not by a
solicitor. Id. Not surprisingly, the solicitors' organization took a different position,
claiming that the presence of lawyers at a tribunal not only protected their clients
but substantially assisted the work of the tribunal. See Comment, Lawyers and
Military Tribunals, 62 SOL. J. 513, 513-14 (1918).
156 See Bibbings, supra note 153, at 61.
157 See RAE, supra note 148, at 100. In R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte
Thatcher, (1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 121, 136-37, the court observed that in almost all cases




and from there, if the Appeals Tribunal consented, to a Central
Tribunal. 158 Both appellate tribunals included legally qualified
members.159 In sum, the administrative military tribunals looked
like courts and seemingly enjoyed the legitimacy of courts.
Confronting the challenge posed by this potentially
encroaching institution, the judges treated the military service
tribunals like they had the munitions tribunals, as inferior courts
subject to their control. In Co-Partnership Farms v. Harvey
Smith,'6° which considered a case of slander against a member of
the East Elloe Local Tribunal, the court announced that the
military service tribunals were ordinary "judicial" rather than
administrative entities. The defendant had argued that the local
tribunal was a judicial body and hence that his statements at the
hearing were "absolutely privileged."'' The plaintiffs, however,
insisted that by virtue of its constitution and functions, the
tribunal was a mere administrative body. Holding unequivocally
that the statements were absolutely privileged, the Court of
King's Bench asserted that the local tribunal was "a body of men
exercising judicial functions., 162 In other words, the work of the
tribunals was normal judicial work. Reaffirming this principle in
161
another case, the court declared flatly that the tribunals were
inferior courts with a "judicial duty."'164  A necessary
consequence of this characterization was that the administrative
bodies were subject to superior court oversight.
Although there was no special statutory procedure for
appealing from a military service tribunal to the High Court, as
existed in the case of a munitions tribunal, applicants dissatisfied
with the tribunal process could obtain superior court review via
the prerogative writs of certiorari and mandamus. In exercising
their power of review, the superior courts determined the
158 Military Service Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 104, § 2(7).
159 See Keith Robbins, The British Experience of Conscientious Objection, in
FACING ARMAGEDDON: THE FIRST WORLD WAR EXPERIENCED 691, 694 (Hugh
Cecil & Peter H. Liddle eds., 1996).
160 (1918) 53 L.J. 191 (K.B.).
161 Id. at 191.
162 Id.
163 R. v. County of London Appeal Tribunal ex parte Febbutt Bros., (1917) 52
L.J. 62 (K.B.).
164 Id. at 62; see Ex parte Mann, (1916) 32 T.L.R. 479, 479 (K.B.) (ruling that the
military tribunals were a "statutory body which would come under the jurisdiction
of the Court").
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substantive law that governed tribunal decisions. The most
controversial High Court decision of the war, R. v. Central
165Tribunal ex parte Parton, demonstrated judicial independence
by interpreting the Military Service Act in a manner contrary to
government policy. Handed down in 1916, Parton dealt with the
appropriate construction of the conscientious objector
exemption. The Chertsey local tribunal had exempted Parton
only from combatant service, and both the Appeal and Central
Tribunals confirmed the order below that Parton enter the
ambulance corps. Parton petitioned the High Court for writs of
mandamus and certiorari, charging that the Central Tribunal had
erred as a matter of law in finding that conscientious objectors
were ineligible for absolute exemption. Declining. to disclose his
reasoning, Mr. Justice Darling brusquely declared that absolute
exemption was available only in cases of essential employment,
financial hardship, or ill-health. It was simply "common sense,"
he proclaimed, that the Military Service Act did not allow a
conscientious objector to avoid military service entirely. 166
This ruling conflicted with both executive and* legislative
policy. Although the wording of the statute was somewhat
ambiguous, the government had expressly instructed the
tribunals that absolute exemption was an option for
conscientious objectors. 67  Indeed, a month later Parliament
clarified that the court had misconstrued the conscience
provision by amending the statute to provide explicitly that
conscientious objectors were eligible for total exemption. 68
Rather than deferring to the other branches of government,
therefore, the High Court in Parton imposed on the tribunals its
own bellicose misunderstanding of statutory meaning.169 And
165 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 476 (K.B.).
166 Id. at 477. A contemporary observed that Mr. Justice Darling conducted the
case "with little dignity or self-restraint." GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 73.
167 See 80 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Feb. 21, 1916) 412; 81 PARL. DEB., H.C.
(5th ser.) (Mar. 23, 1916) 353. Just the previous month, on March 23, 1916, the
President of the Local Government Board had written to all tribunals clarifying that
absolute exemption was available, and four days later he reaffirmed his position at a
conference of tribunal chairmen. See GRAHAM, supra note 150, at 83; RAE, supra
note 148, at 118-30.
168 Military Service Act (Sess. 2), May 25, 1916, 6 & 7 Geo. 5, c. 15, § 4(3).
169 The courts also dealt substantively with other matters of conscription policy.
See, e.g., Towler v. Sutton, (1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 46 (holding that the refusal of a
recruiting officer to allow an atheist to affirm rather than swear constituted a
rejection of his enlistment); R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Thatcher,
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despite the statutory amendment in May 1916, the High Court's
influence continued for the duration of the war, with many
tribunals relying on Parton to require conscientious objectors to
serve in non-combatant capacities.
70
In addition to issuing decisions constraining the tribunals in
matters of substantive law, the superior courts also determined
tribunal procedures. As the government had declined to
promulgate procedural regulations, under statute the tribunals
were free to design their own rules. 17  The superior courts
insisted on reviewing them nonetheless. For example, the
conscientious objector in Parton also raised the procedural claim
that he was entitled to be heard orally before the Central
172Tribunal. Mr. Justice Darling, however, confirmed the
tribunal's right to render a decision based on written materials
alone.1 7 3 The High Court issued numerous other instructions to
tribunals regarding the hearing and appellate processes, and in
so doing bent legislative and executive instruments to its will,
often treating statutory and regulatory requirements as mere
dispensable formalities.1
7 4
Thus, due to the judges' zealous pursuit of their institutional
self-interest, the munitions and military service tribunals never
evolved into administrative agencies capable of supplanting the
courts. The very fact that they were "judicial" entities,
employing judicial personnel and procedures, allowed the
superior courts to regard them as subordinate bodies within their
(1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 121 (establishing the requirements for an occupational
exemption); R. v. Essex Tribunal ex parte Pikesley, (1918) 82 J.P. 1, 2 (C.A.)
(holding that a national security regulation was not ultra vires unless it was "utterly
unreasonable").
170 See, e.g., ARTHUR MARWICK, BRITAIN IN THE CENTURY OF TOTAL WAR:
WAR, PEACE AND SOCIAL CHANGE, 1900-1967, at 70 (1968); RAE, supra note 148,
at 120; Bibbings, supra note 153, at 65.
171 See Stephen, supra note 151, at 148.
172 R. v. Central Tribunal ex parte Parton, (1916),32 T.L.R. 476 (K.B.). The
Central Tribunal did not generally hear the parties in person. See RAE, supra note
148, at 104.
173 Parton, (1916) 32 T.L.R. at 477. The court held that the tribunals were free to
adopt a procedure that was "not that of the King's Bench Division." Id. It relied
on a recent decision by the House of Lords, Local Government Board v. Arlidge
[1915] A.C. 120 (H.L.), which rejected the notion that judicial methods or
procedures necessarily applied to actions by a local governmental authority. See
Bibbings, supra note 153, at 62.
174 See infra text accompanying notes 360-96.
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sphere of authority. That is, the precise reason the tribunals
constituted a threat to the traditional judges ultimately inured to
the latter's advantage, legitimating their efforts to bring these
bodies under judicial rather than executive control.
C. Military Courts in Ireland: The Challenge of Competing
Jurisdiction over Civilians
An even more serious threat to traditional court authority was
the creation of military courts in Ireland to adjudicate offenses
committed by civilians. The civil courts not only resisted
military encroachment but also turned the tables on the military
authorities: they treated the military entities as they did
magistrates' courts and administrative tribunals-as "inferior
courts" subject to their oversight and review.
As noted, the judiciary in England repulsed a military
challenge to its authority by restoring jury trial after a seven-
month period in which civilians were subject to court-martial for
breaching DORA regulations. 175 In Ireland, military jurisdiction
over civilians had a longer and far deeper tenure. In 1916 and
again in 1920, the British government declared martial law in
certain Irish counties and suspended operation of the DORA
provision restoring jury trial. Even in areas not under martial
law, special legislation for Ireland authorized court-martial of
citizens for ordinary crimes. Throughout the period of Irish
conflict, this expansive military jurisdiction threatened to
undermine the authority of the regular courts. Yet the civil
courts never ceased to function; indeed, they entertained a
prolonged series of civilian challenges to military trials pursuant
to the writs of habeas corpus, certiorari, and prohibition. Events
in Ireland during and immediately after World War I provide a
useful case study of the intersection of civil and military justice,
and they demonstrate yet again the forceful reaction of the
common law judges to perceived threats to their jurisdiction.
175 See supra text accompanying notes 60-69.
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1. The Legal Framework: Statutory Courts-Martial and Military
Tribunals
The British government first declared martial law in Ireland
during the Easter Rebellion of April 1916,176 triggering a DORA
provision that authorized court-martial of civilians during a
"military emergency., 177  The DORA court-martial regime
included imposing the death penalty where the accused had
acted with the intention of assisting the enemy. 78 Immediately
following the rebellion, 3419 Irish civilians were arrested and
2006 were tried by DORA courts-martial; of these, ninety
received the death penalty and fifteen were executed.
179
Martial law was lifted in November 1916,180 but courts-martial
for civilians reappeared in response to a second outbreak of
guerilla activity against the British government in 1920.181
Parliament reacted by passing the Restoration and Maintenance
of Order in Ireland Act ("ROIA"), 18 2 which enlarged the court-
martial provisions of DORA to allow military trial of civilians
not only for national security violations but also for ordinary
crimes. 18 3 The new statutory courts-martial created under ROIA
could impose a death sentence where such a penalty was
176 See 81 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (Apr. 26, 1916) 2483 (H.H. Asquith);
EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 339.
177 The provision stated: "In the event of invasion or other special military
emergency arising out of the present war, His Majesty may by Proclamation
forthwith suspend the operation of this section [establishing jury trial], either
generally or as respects any area specified in the Proclamation ..... DORA
(Amendment) Act Mar. 16, 1915, 5 Geo. 5, c. 34, § 7.
178 DORA Consol. Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo. 5, c. 8, § 1(4).
179 See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 342; CHARLES TOWNSHEND,
POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN IRELAND: GOVERNMENT AND RESISTANCE SINCE 1848,
at 308 (1983).
180 See TOWNSHEND, supra note 179, at 313.
181 Id. at 340.
182 Aug. 9, 1920, 10& 11 Geo. 5, c. 31.
183 Id. § 1(2). ROIA-applied "to the trial of persons alleged to have committed,
and the punishment on conviction, of persons who have committed crimes in
Ireland." Id. "Crime" was defined broadly to include "any treason, treason felony,
misdemeanor, or other offence punishable, whether on indictment or on summary
conviction, by imprisonment or by any greater punishment." Id. § 1(6). ROIA also
eliminated the requirement in the DORA Consolidation Act, Nov. 27, 1914, 5 Geo.
5, c. 8, § 1(4), that to be subject to the death penalty a civilian must have assisted a
foreign enemy. Although the war against Germany technically continued until
1921, it was effectively over, and the point of eliminating the clause was to reach
rebels against English rule rather than wartime collaborators with enemy powers.
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available under ordinary law, provided that a member of the
military court was a person of "legal knowledge and
experience."18
Despite the draconian nature of the ROIA court-martial
scheme, the Army was not satisfied; it considered its statutory
provisions too cumbersome for use against a population in
185
rebellion. It therefore determined to impose martial law. On
December 10, 1920, the Lord Lieutenant in Ireland promulgated
martial law in the four southwestern counties of Cork,
Tipperary, Kerry, and Limerick; two days later General Nevil
Macready, Commander of the Crown forces, proclaimed any
person possessing arms in the martial law area to be subject to
the death penalty. 186 Martial law allowed the Army to set up
new entities of military justice known as "military tribunals,"
which utilized a more simplified and expeditious procedure than
187
statutory courts-martial. Among other things, military
tribunals were not limited to penalties available under the
general criminal law and could impose the death sentence for
any offense. 188 The military tribunals also differed from DORA
and ROIA courts-martial in their formal legal character.
Rooted in the exigencies of military necessity, these non-
statutory bodies were theoretically "nonlegal," and under
prevailing legal theory their actions were nonjusticiable by the
184 RESTORATION OF ORDER IN IRELAND REGULATIONS, Reg. 69(5); see
CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 69. Persons of legal experience were nominated by
the Lord-Lieutenant and certified by the Lord Chancellor of Ireland or the Lord
Chief Justice of England as being so qualified. ROIA Reg. 69(5); see Whelan v. R.,
[1921] 2 Ir. R. 310 (K.B.) (involving a prisoner's challenge to his conviction on the
ground that no certification had been provided that a member of the court had legal
knowledge and experience).
185 See CHARLES TOWNSHEND, THE BRITISH CAMPAIGN IN IRELAND, 1919-
1921, at 103 (1975).
186 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 30; EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 360.
On January 4 the Cabinet extended the martial law area to the counties of Clare,
Kilkenny, Waterford, and Wexford. See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 30; EWING &
GEARTY, supra note 2, at 361.
187 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 86-87.
188 The offenses tried by military tribunals were generally treason and improper
possession of arms. There were twenty-four executions for political offenses in
1920-21, ten pursuant to convictions by ROIA courts-martial and fourteen pursuant
to convictions by military tribunals. See id. at 97.
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ordinary courts.' s 9 The civil judges could not therefore treat
these entities as inferior courts under their supervision.' 9°
Adding to the legal complexity, DORA and ROIA courts-
martial continued to function alongside the new "nonlegal"
military tribunals, as did the ordinary civil courts. 9' Repeatedly,
the civil courts entertained challenges by Irish rebels to both
courts-martial and "nonlegal" military tribunals, eagerly taking
on the task of determining the authority of the various military
courts and resolving issues of competing military jurisdictions.
2. Asserting the Principle of Civil Primacy
The civil courts confronted the jurisdictional challenge arising
from courts-martial and military tribunals directly, insisting on
their principled right to supervise courts-martial and to
determine the legitimacy of military tribunals. Though the civil
courts generally upheld the decisions of these military bodies on
the merits, their assertions of civil control were profoundly
significant. Regardless of the outcome of the cases, repeated
civil intrusions into military justice seriously hampered the
military in its quest to impose order in Ireland. As General
Macready observed, the rebels never hesitated to take full
advantage of the civil courts whenever a military death sentence
was at issue:
Seeing that as a general rule the civil courts upheld the
decisions of the military courts it may be asked how the civil
courts hampered the military authorities. It was the delay and
189 In Dicey's classic formulation, military tribunals derived from "the common
law right of the Crown and its servants to repel force with force" rather than from
law. A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 183 (8th ed. 1915). As Lord Halsbury stated in Tilonko v. Attorney-
General of the Colony of Natal, [1907] A.C 93, 94 (P.C.), martial law was "no law at
all." Although it was "found convenient and decorous, from time to time, to
authorize what are called 'courts' to administer punishments, and to restrain by acts
of repression the violence that is committed in time of war," to analogize these
summary proceedings under the supervision of a military commander to regular
court proceedings was "quite illusory." Id. at 94-95.
190 See infra text accompanying notes 222-24.
191 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 32-33; EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at
361. In areas not under martial law-which comprised most of the country-ROIA
remained the primary vehicle for prosecuting rebels. See CAMPBELL, supra note 97,
at 36. Dublin was outside the martial law area, which facilitated the hearing of
challenges to the military tribunals in the civil courts. See 2 NEVIL MACREADY,
ANNALS OF AN ACTIVE LIFE 516 (1925).
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uncertainty involved which nullified the effect of martial law,
encouraging the rebels to take advantage of every quibble
which the fertile brains of sharp Irish lawyers could discover,
and proportionately depressing the forces of the Crown, who
could not be expected to understand the constitutional
questions involved in these applications to the King's
Bench ...192
If writs by the High Court had not run, he added bitterly, "we
should have been saved all this trouble.' ' 193  Indeed, he
complained, the appeals process caused so many postponements
of sentences that at times it became inhumane to carry them out.
This consequence was "fully realized by those who acted for the
prisoners, and who lost no opportunity of dragging on the
proceedings to the utmost limit. ' 194 The judges fully understood
that their insistence on civil review frustrated the government
and undermined military authority. As the Master of the Rolls
admitted in Egan v. Macready,'95 his willingness to review the
rebel conviction at issue "unduly hamper[ed] the military
authority in their effort to establish peace and order in this
distracted country.', 196 Although conceding that the principle of
civil review produced critical practical consequences, however,
the civil courts never retreated from the position that military
conduct was subject to their oversight and control.
To claim civil supremacy required different strategies with
regard to the statutory courts-martial and the "nonlegal"
military tribunals. The traditional courts could easily treat
statutory courts-martial under DORA and ROIA as analogous
to magistrates' courts and administrative tribunals-that is, as
inferior "legal" courts subject to their supervision. With respect
to the "nonlegal" military tribunals, however, whose procedures
and decisions were not justiciable by the civil authorities, the
superior courts needed an alternate way to assert civil control.
192 2 MACREADY, supra note 191, at 516-17.
193 Quoted in TOWNSHEND, supra note 179, at 16; see CAMPBELL, supra note 97,
at 138 (commenting that though the applications were not successful, they clogged
up the courts and annoyed the military authorities); Charles Townshend, Martial
Law: Legal and Administrative Problems of Civil Emergency in Britain and the
Empire, 1800-1940, 25 HIST. J. 167, 186-87 (1982).
194 2 MACREADY, supra note 191, at 517.
195 [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265 (Ch.).
196 Id. at 279.
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As will be shown, they found the solution in claiming a right to
determine the very legality of these military entities.
a. Civil Control over Statutory Courts-Martial Under DORA and
ROIA
DORA and ROIA courts-martial were statutory bodies over
which the common law courts claimed their ordinary power of
review. Indeed, it was well established that the superior courts
had oversight over courts-martial. As the King's Bench asserted
in R. v. Murphy,'9 7 a statutory court-martial was "an inferior
Court, subject to our limited right of control," ' 9" and there was
"no doubt that this Court has always exercised over Courts-
martial, and over other Courts of limited jurisdiction, a power to
prevent them acting without or in excess of jurisdiction. '"1 99
Comparing statutory courts-martial to magistrates' courts, the
High Court stated categorically that such bodies were "always
the subject of jealous supervision by the Superior Courts.''20°
The mechanisms of review over courts-martial were the
prerogative writs of certiorari, prohibition, and habeas corpus,
201writs that ran to statutory bodies in their ordinary course. In
reviewing conduct by courts-martial pursuant to these writs, the
civil court judges asserted the primacy of civil law and
institutions in three ways: first, where common law and military
regulations conflicted, the courts required courts-martial to
comply with the former rather than the latter; second, they
evaluated the sufficiency of military procedures using abstract
common law principles; and third, they protected civil
institutions from military interference.
A case from the Easter Rising, R. v. Governor of Lewes
202Prison ex parte Doyle, illustrated that the courts viewed
197 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 190 (K.B.).
198 Id. at 217.
199 Id. at 223; see R. v. Editor of the Daily Mail ex parte Farnsworth, (1921) 37
T.L.R. 310, 313 (K.B.) (noting that whenever and wherever the court had
jurisdiction "to correct an inferior Court, it also has jurisdiction to ... correct a
Court-martial").
200 Murphy, [1921] 2 Ir. R. at 224.
201 In Murphy the court stated: "If a Court-martial acts without or in excess of
jurisdiction, this Court can exercise its controlling authority against the tribunal by
writs of prohibition or certiorari, and against the governor of the prison, or whoever
improperly detains a person, by means of a writ of habeas corpus." Id.
202 [1917] 2 K.B. 254.
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general common law principles as more authoritative than
applicable military law. Doyle was a Dublin plasterer who
received a death sentence from a DORA court-martial for
participating in the rebellion. His trial, like all field courts-
203martial of rebels in 1916, was conducted in secret. Doyle
petitioned for a habeas writ on the ground that secret trials were
unlawful under military law, relying on a specific rule of
procedure promulgated under the Army Act that required
courts-martial to be "held in open court, in the presence of the
accused., 20 4 While acknowledging this military rule, the King's
Bench found it inapposite in light of a contrary common law
principle allowing closed proceedings. It was plain, the Chief
Justice declared, that "inherent jurisdiction exists in any Court
which enables it to exclude the public., 20 5  Like Norman v.
Matthews,2° Doyle upheld the right of all inferior courts to close
their doors to the public under their inherent common law
powers, but whereas in Norman the common law rule was at
least compatible with a DORA regulation permitting closed
proceedings, here the common law rule directly conflicted with
the relevant military regulation. Nonetheless, the court in Doyle
found the common law rule to govern, thereby affirming the
supremacy of civil over military law.
Second, even where the courts treated a specialized military
rule as controlling, they evaluated a court-martial's compliance
with it using abstract common law principles. The defendant in
Whelan v. R.207 objected that his court-martial had not
comported with a ROIA requirement that a member of the
court be certified as possessing legal experience. Relying on a
plethora of treatises and common law decisions handed down
over the previous century, the King's Bench responded by
applying a general common law presumption that "a person
acting in a public or judicial capacity is duly authorized to do
203 See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 343.
204 ARMY RULES OF PROCEDURE 1907, at Rule 119(c). The rules were
promulgated under the Army Act, 1881, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 58.
205 Doyle, [1917] 2 K.B. at 271. The court relied on Scott v. Scott, [1913] A.C. 417
(H.L.), a House of Lords divorce case mandating open trials but carving out
exceptions for urgent circumstances.
206 [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.); see supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
207 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 310 (K.B.).
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so. 2°8  Similarly, in R. v. Murphy, °9 where an Irish rebel
challenged his conviction on the ground that he was not given an
adequate opportunity to cross-examine prosecution witnesses,
the High Court reviewed centuries of common law precedent to
conclude that the court-martial's error was not fatal to its
jurisdiction. 21 Again, the civil court equated military with civil
bodies and applied an ordinary common law principle to
determine the sufficiency of a specialized military procedure.
Common law rules governing civil courts thus trumped military
law even in the context of a court-martial.
Third, the civil courts used the common law to insulate civil
institutions from military interference. R. v. Fitzgerald2
involved procedures applicable not to the court-martial itself but
rather to a prisoner's detention between court-martial and
sentencing. In 1921 a ROIA court-martial convicted the
proprietors and editor of a Dublin newspaper for violating
ROIA press regulations. At the end of the trial, a military
detachment acting without a written order from the military
court arrested the defendants and conveyed them to a civil
prison.212 The prisoners petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus
on the ground that a transfer from military to civil custody based
merely on oral statements of anonymous soldiers was unlawful.
The Crown argued that since the defendants were subject to
military law, they could be moved from military to civil
confinement without a written order. Finding this contention to
be "quite untenable , ' '23 the King's Bench put on record its
desire "in the clearest way possible to repudiate, 21 4 the doctrine
that a civil prison could detain a king's subject without proper
written authority: "To sanction such a course would be to strike
a deadly blow at the doctrine of personal liberty, which is part of
the first rudiments of the constitution., 21 5 Moreover, the court-
martial's failure to issue an order left the civil jailer "without the
208 Id. at 313.
209 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 190 (K.B.).
210 Id. at 226-27.
211 (1921) 55 Ir. L.T.R. 60 (K.B.).
212 Id. at 60.
213 Id. at 64.
214 Id. at 63 (per Molony, J.).
215 Id. (per Malory, J.).
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protection of any written mandate ' '216 and therefore exposed to
the risk of a lawsuit. Declaring that there was "no vinculum or
bond of union between the military and the civil custody, ' 17 the
King's Bench issued the writ of habeas corpus. Ostensibly
protecting the liberty of civilians against overreaching by the
Army, the court equally protected a civil institution from
subordination to military command.
b. Civil Control over "Nonlegal" Military Tribunals Under
Martial Law
Asserting civil control over military tribunals created under
martial law was more problematic than doing so over courts-
martial. Even exercising jurisdiction faced a special obstacle: the
writs of certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition, which were
directed at the judicial entity itself, did not run to a "nonlegal"
body. Nonetheless, the writ of habeas corpus, which produced
an order to the authority holding a prisoner in custody, was
always available. As Viscount Cave declared in a House of
Lords decision, although a civil court could not order a military
tribunal to quash proceedings or prohibit judicial action, it could
218
always instruct a military commander to release a prisoner.
The wartime judges invariably spoke of the writ of habeas
corpus with reverence, emphasizing its importance in securing
individual liberty. As the Master of the Rolls proclaimed, it was
always the right of the subject "to apply to any Judge of the High
Court for the writ of habeas corpus, and, if the writ is refused, to
proceed from Judge to Judge., 219 Moreover, it was the duty of
each judge to "form his independent opinion and to act upon
it."' 220 Nonetheless, it is significant that the writ also served the
judges' institutional self-interest by conferring on civil courts the
power to command the military authorities. Through the writ of
habeas corpus, an Irish civilian arrested or tried by a military
216 Id. at 64.
217 Id.
218 R. v. Clifford & O'Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570, 586 (H.L.(I.)).
219 Egan v. Macready, [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265, 279 (Ch.).
220 Id. In R. v. Adjutant-General ex parte Childers, [1923] 1 Ir. R. 5, 13 (Ch.), the
Master of the Rolls also applauded the "right of every subject of the King to apply
at any time for the writ of habeas corpus."
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body could, and inevitably did, challenge the proceedings in civil
court.2 1
Even with the availability of habeas jurisdiction, however,
another impediment to civil control presented itself: it was well
settled that the procedures and decisions of nonlegal entities
222 223
were not justiciable. As the court declared in R. v. Allen, a
civil court could not in wartime "control the military authorities,
or question any sentence imposed in the exercise of martial
law., 224 The common law judges were thus compelled to find
another way to supervise the military courts. Their solution was
to claim authority not to review results as to particular
convictions but to decide the prior dispositive question of
whether military tribunals were legitimate bodies at all. In every
case involving the death sentence, therefore, the courts carefully
evaluated the fundamental lawfulness of military tribunals under
martial law. In so doing, they considered two basic theories of
invalidity: first, that no "state of war" existed to justify martial
law; and second, that ROIA's comprehensive courts-martial
scheme pre-empted the creation of military tribunals trying
221 In addition to considering petitions for habeas writs, the common law courts
also claimed the power to review on direct appeal a lower court's denial of a writ
seeking to challenge the conduct of a military tribunal. In Clifford, [1921] 2 A.C.
570, the House of Lords dealt with the situation of two civilians sentenced to death
in April 1921 by a military tribunal for unauthorized possession of weapons. The
defendants applied in Chancery for a writ of prohibition restraining the military
tribunal from carrying out the death sentence. The judge refused the writ, and the
defendants appealed. The House of Lords considered whether a denial of the writ
was a non-appealable order within section 50 of the Judicature Act (Ireland) 1877,
which precluded appeals of criminal matters from the High Court. It concluded
that the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords had jurisdiction to hear the appeal
since the military tribunal was only a nonlegal military committee advising the
commanding officer; thus, what was appealed was not a legal "crime." Id. at 581.
The fact that the court could hear the appeal meant, however, that it could not
grant the relief requested, as a court order could not be issued to a nonlegal entity.
See id. at 590; Johnstone v. O'Sullivan, [1923] 2 Ir. R. 13, 22 (C.A.) (expanding
Clifford to hold that an appeal also lay from an order refusing a writ of habeas
corpus).
222 See, e.g., Ex parte Marais, [1902] A.C. 109, 115 (P.C.); R. v. Strickland ex parte
Garde, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 317, 328 (K.B.); R. v. Allen, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241,269-72 (K.B.).
223 [1921] 2 I. R. 241.
224 Id. at 272; see R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 333, 334 (K.B.)
(ruling that once a state of war was proved to the court's satisfaction, the court's
hands were tied); R. v. Strickland ex parte Garde, [1921] 2 Ir. R. at 332 (stating that
once a state of.war was established, a civil court could not "interfere to determine
what is or what is not necessary").
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civilians for the same crimes. In evaluating these objections, and
even ruling occasionally in the prisoners' favor, the common law
courts again asserted the primacy of civil over military law.
(i) The "State of War" Inquiry
The civil courts repeatedly insisted that it was their unique
role to determine whether a "state of war" existed to justify
martial law, even though this question seemingly fell within
military expertise. The leading precedent was Ex parte
225Marais, a decision by the Privy Council during the Boer War
holding that martial law could only be triggered by a "state of
war." According to Marais, the courts were solely responsible
for deciding when war existed, .and the continuing operation of
226the civil courts was not dispositive evidence of its absence.
Moreover, as a subsequent case established, whether the military
authorities had proclaimed martial law was irrelevant to the civil
227determination.
During the Irish rebellion the civil courts continually
deliberated whether guerilla conflict satisfied Marais's
requirement of "state of war." The first major case dealing with
228this issue, R. v. Allen, involved a civilian sentenced to death by
a military tribunal in Cork for possessing a revolver, some
ammunition, and a book entitled Night Fighting that purported
to be an official publication of the Irish Republican Army
("IRA").229 Such a punishment would not have been available in
a ROIA court-martial. General Macready submitted a lengthy
affidavit stating that the rebellion amounted to "actual warfare
of a guerilla character., 230 He recounted that between July 1920
and February 1921, the IRA had raided the mail, held up trains,
destroyed police barracks, attacked government offices, and
231
ambushed and killed many soldiers. - Since his affidavit was
225 [1902] A.C. 109.
226 Id. at 114.
227 See Tilonko v. Attorney-Gen. of the Colony of Natal, [1907] A.C. 93, 94 (P.C.)
("The notion that 'martial law' exists by reason of the proclamation ... is an entire
delusion.").
228 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241 (K.B.).
229 Id. at 242..




uncontroverted, the court easily concluded that a state of war
existed.232
Irish petitioners did not again make the mistake of failing to
counter Macready's evidence. In a similar case the following
month, the prisoner introduced affidavits from various notables
in Cork-the High Sheriff, Justices of the Peace, and the
President of University College-certifying that life in the city
continued normally. The officials testified that the Assizes were
sitting, churches and schools operating, and daily business
233activities proceeding in their ordinary way. When Crown
counsel suggested during oral argument that the court was
incompetent to decide the matter, the Chief Justice bridled.
Allen, he declared, had made clear the judges' right to decide
whether a state of war existed, and "we will continue to assert
that right., 234  He found the government's contention that
Macready's evidence was irrebuttable to be "destitute of
authority" and "absolutely opposed" to the prior judgment:
"[W]e desire to state, in the clearest possible language, that this
Court has the power and the duty to decide whether a state of
war exists which justifies the application of martial law., 235 As it
turned out, the judge's independent evaluation of the military
236situation coincided with that of the Army. Nonetheless, the
civil court held firm to the principle that the predicate for the
military's autonomy-the existence of a state of war-lay in the
determination of the civil judges alone.
232 Id. at 265.
233 R. v. Strickland ex parte Garde, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 317, 328 (K.B.). The affidavits
further pointed to the anomaly that ROIA courts-martials tried treason cases daily,
indicating that there was no need for separate military tribunals. Id. at 321.
234 Id. at 326.
235 Id. at 329. He found the government's argument to be "somewhat startling."
Id. The judge also took pains to point out that he did not sit as a judge with the
consent of the military authorities: "It is quite clear that the right of a Judge to sit is
derived from the King and not from the military authorities under martial law." Id.
at 331. "So far, therefore, from being in any way subject to the military authorities,
a Judge of Assize in the execution of the King's commission is authorized to
command the assistance of every liege subject of His Majesty." Id.
236 The court noted that Macready's affidavit, written two months after the
affidavit filed in Allen, pointed to an enormous increase in casualties among the
military forces and police. Id. at 329-30.
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Subsequent cases, while largely supporting the Army's•. 237
position that a state of war existed, were similarly meticulous
-•• 238
in scrutinizing military conditions. The judges seemed to rely
primarily on their own personal experience, treating it as more
relevant than any evidence submitted by the Army. In R. v.
239Adjutant-General ex parte Childers, for example, the Master of
the Rolls based his conclusion not on the government's affidavit
but rather on his personal knowledge of the destruction of his
courtroom:
I am sitting here in this temporary makeshift for a Court of
Justice. Why? Because one of the noblest buildings in this
country, which was erected for the accommodation of the
King's Courts and was the home of justice for more than a
hundred years, is now a mass of crumbling ruins .... 240
Taking judicial notice of the bombing of railways, the blocking
of roads, and the torching of mansions, the judge concluded that
"[i]f this is not a state of war, I would like to know what is." 241 In
242
a subsequent case, Johnstone v. O'Sullivan, the Master of the
Rolls again based his judgment "upon my own knowledge of
what is going on in the greater part of this island., 243  He
237 See, e.g., R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne & Mulcahy, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 333, 334
(K.B.) (noting that "for the reasons just given in Garde's Case... a state of war still
exist[ed]"); R. v. Clifford & O'Sullivan, [1921] 2 A.C. 570, 579 (H.L.(I.)) (Viscount
Cave calling attention to the ruling of the lower court that a state of war existed and
that therefore the civil courts had no jurisdiction to interfere with the proceedings
of the military authority); Egan v. Macready, [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265, 269 (Ch.) (stating
that the affidavits left no room for doubt that there existed a "widespread rebellion
amounting to a state of war").
238 The judges rarely set forth a formal standard for determining the existence of
a state of war except to assert that the continuing operation of the civil courts was
not conclusive evidence of its absence. See, e.g., Ex parte Marais, [1902] A.C. 109,
114 (P.C.); R. v. Allen, [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241, 270 (K.B.). An exception was Johnstone
v. O'Sullivan, [1923] 2 Ir. R. 13 (C.A.), where the Master of the Rolls applied a test
of whether "the forcible resistance to authority [was] so widespread, so continuous,
so formidable, of such duration that the help of an army must be invoked . . .
habitually or constantly, lest the State shall perish." Id. at 25. Tested in that way,
he had no doubt that "in point of law, a state of war exists." Id.
239 [1923] 1 Ir. R. 5 (Ch.).
240 Id. at 13.
241 Id.
242 [1923] 2 Ir. R. 13 (C.A.).
243 Id. at 23-24.
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determined that there was undoubtedly war: "[a] guerilla war, a
sort of war perhaps, but war.",
244
Though the cases generally favored the Army in their
substantive results, R. v. Military Governor ex parte O'Brien
2 4
1
demonstrated that the "state of war" investigation was more
than a mere formality. After soldiers of the Irish Free State
interned IRA member Nora O'Brien in Dublin in January 1923,
she applied to the Court of Chancery for a writ of habeas
246
corpus. She argued that a state of war no longer raged in the
area, relying primarily on a newspaper report that Eamonn de
Valera, President of the IRA, had issued a proclamation
247directing its members to cease all acts of warfare. The trial
judge rejected O'Brien's claim, viewing the cease-fire as merely
248
a breathing space while the irregulars reorganized. Drawing
on his own daily observations, he recounted:
It is common knowledge-and what is common knowledge I
can take judicial notice of-that the Free State army has not
been allowed to rest. What do I see on my way down to Court
every morning? Armoured cars, military lorries full of armed
troops, military patrols in our chief thoroughfares; even the
approaches to the Courts guarded by soldiers with fixed
bayonets. When I see all this, surely I cannot say that we have
arrived at a state of peace, for which all orderly citizens arelonging.
In a surprising decision, however, the Court of Appeal reversed.
Molony, who had authored all the previous decisions finding that
a state of war existed, displayed his open-mindedness by
questioning whether in this case there was in fact "deliberate,
organised resistance by force and arms to the laws and
operations of the lawful Government. ' ,250  He concluded that
244 Id. at 24.
245 [1924] 1 Ir. R. 32 (C.A.).
246 Id. at 32.
247 Id. at 33.
248 Id. at 36.
249 Id. at 36-37.
250 Id. at 38. He commented that the onus of establishing the existence of a state
of war rested on the prosecution. Further, he stated that "if there is war, we cannot,
durante bello, inquire into or pass judgment upon the conduct of the Commander of
the Forces in repressing the war," but that if there was not war, "it is our manifest
duty to see that no person shall be deprived of his or her liberty except in
accordance with the law." Id.
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despite a certain amount of disorder, it had "not been proved
that a state of war or armed rebellion at present exist[ed] in the
City of Dublin., 251 In defiance of both the Army and the Irish
government, therefore, the Court of Appeal asserted its civil
authority to release Nora O'Brien from military custody. The
case thus demonstrated the significance of the repeated prior
statements that there were legal limits to military power: the
principle of civil control was available when a court actually
desired to give it effect.
(ii) The Issue of ROIA Preemption
The courts determined not only whether a state of war existed
but also whether Parliament's creation of statutory courts-
martial in August 1920 pre-empted the subsequent
implementation of a military tribunal system. Here too the
principle of judicial review turned out to be more than mere
verbiage, though on this issue two divisions of the High Court
reached disparate results. Whereas the Court of King's Bench
upheld military tribunals as a valid supplement to statutory
courts-martial, the Court of Chancery ruled that the court-
martial scheme under ROIA precluded military tribunals under
martial law entirely.
In a series of unanimous opinions authored by Molony, the
King's Bench consistently rejected the prisoners' claim that
ROIA prescribed Parliament's exclusive method for dealing
212
with the crisis. R. v. Allen, for example, pointed out that the
253public danger had escalated since ROIA's enactment , and it
suggested that if there was a problem with co-existing courts
inflicting radically different punishments for the same offense, it
2-54
was up to Parliament to resolve.
The wholly unexpected decision of the Court of Chancery in
255Egan v. Macready, in contrast, rejected the position of theKing's Bench. Molony had proved in O'Brien that judicial
251 Id. at 42.
252 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241 (K.B.).
253 Id. at 271.
254 Id. at 272. Allen was followed in R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne, [1921] 2 Ir.
R. 333 (K.B.), where Molony again rejected the accused's argument that the
prerogative right of the king to proclaim martial law had been surrendered by
ROIA. Id. at 334.
255 [1921] 1 Ir. R. 265 (Ch.).
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review was not a mere formality by actually issuing the writ in a
"state of war" case. In this instance O'Connor, who invariably
agreed with the Army on the "state of war" question, charted an
independent course on the ROIA preemption issue. Ruling that
ROIA was not enabling but prohibitory, he nullified the military
tribunals on the alternate ground that the power to declare
martial law had been surrendered with the passage of ROIA the
previous year:
To hold that, notwithstanding the Restoration of Order Act,
the military authority can waive aside Courts-martial, and
sweep away the limitations as to punishment ... would be a
new development of British Constitutional Law, for which I
can find no authority. The claim of the military authority to
override legislation, specially made for a state of war, would
257
seem to me to call for a new Bill of Rights.
If the emergency was greater than Parliament had contemplated,
it was for the legislature to enlarge ROIA's scope; Parliament
was in full session and presumably not in "a lethargic condition,
incapable of energetic action., 258  Despite his view that the
rebels had perpetrated "appalling murders, conflagrations, and
other outrages, 259 O'Connor granted Egan the writ of habeas
corpus. He did so based on the "first principle of British law:
that every subject of the King is at least entitled to be legally
tried and legally convicted.
' 260
256 See supra text accompanying notes 245-51.
257 Egan, [1921] 1 Ir. R. at 275. O'Connor also noted that Egan's crime and arrest
had taken place on May 26 but the trial was not held until June 11, suggesting that
summary action was not necessary. Id. at 277.
258 Id. at 274.
259 Id. at 278.
260 Id. at 279. Interestingly, the Master of the Rolls observed that a court-martial,
in contrast to a military tribunal, was "absolutely fair and impartial," with precise
requirements to ensure against miscarriages of justice:
In particular, the charge against the accused must be precisely formulated.
Contrast this with the procedure before this so-called military Court. The
charge here is that the accused "was improperly in possession of
ammunition." What does this mean? It might mean anything from some
desperate criminal purpose down to some technical irregularity. Justice
requires that an accused person should know exactly with what he is
charged.
Id. at 278. He thus based his decision not only on parliamentary intent but also on
his independent view of the merits of the procedures supplied by the Act.
[Vol. 87, 401
Judicial Power and Moral Ideology in Wartime
Horrified at the decision, both General Macready and Major
General Strickland disobeyed the order to release Egan.
O'Connor, equally furious, issued writs of attachment against
Macready, Strickland and the governor of the prison. He
declared that their obstruction amounted to "a deliberate
contempt of Court-a thing unprecedented in this Court and the
whole history of British law.",26' The issue was explosive, and
since negotiations for a truce between British forces and the
IRA had just been concluded, all sides wished to defuse the
262looming constitutional crisis. Without consulting Macready,
the government released Egan. In a statement in the House of
Commons, the government insisted that its actions were
unrelated to the case and continued to deny that civil courts had
any power to overrule military tribunals in the martial law263
area. But the true situation was readily apparent. As
Macready complained in his memoirs, requiring a soldier to
account to any judge "makes the administration of martial law
impossible, and if I may be permitted to use the expression,
ridiculous., 264 .O'Connor, as noted, readily understood that his
assertion of civil authority was obstructing the military
• • 265
authorities, but from his perspective civil review served a
higher principle: "There are considerations more important even
than shortening the temporary duration of an insurrection.
2 66
Violating certain immutable principles of justice, he insisted,
would produce "lasting detriment to the true interest and well-
being of a civilized community., 267 Such principles, obviously,
included maintaining a firm civil presence in affairs of military
justice.
261 Id. at 280. There were two theories underlying martial law, one that it derived
from the common law and the other that it was rooted in the prerogative. The first
theory encouraged a non-interventionist judicial posture and underlay R. v. Allen;
the second justified an interventionist approach and underpinned R. v. Egan. The
precise legal status of martial law is still unresolved. For a discussion of these
theories, see CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 123-48.
262 See EWING & GEARTY, supra note 2, at 365. The truce was announced on
July 11, three days after O'Connor reserved judgment in Egan. See id.
263 See 146 PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th ser.) (Aug. 10, 1921) 437 (J.A. Chamberlain); 2
MACREADY, supra note 191, at 591; ToWNSHEND, supra note 179, at 187.
264 2 MACREADY, supra note 191, at 590.
265 See supra text accompanying notes 195-96.




Thus, the civil courts in Ireland dealt with the problem of
military jurisdiction over civilians by claiming a right to review
court-martial procedures, issuing dispositive rulings on the
viability of military tribunals, and resolving questions of the
interaction between competing systems of military justice. The
civil courts also exerted their authority by insisting upon their
power to review all military actions upon termination of the
conflict, even those concededly not justiciable during a state of
martial law. Adhering to a principle elaborated by A.V.
268Dicey, the judges consistently affirmed that after the war they
were entitled to evaluate whether the degree of military force
exercised during the conflict had been reasonable. As Molony
declared in R. v. Allen,269 upon termination of the conflict
"persons may be made liable, civilly and criminally, for any acts
which they are proved to have done in excess of what was
reasonably required by the necessities of the case. 270  This
proposition was actually applied in 1921 in Higgins v. Willis,2 in
which Molony refused to dismiss a suit by a suspected rebel
against a brigade commander for damaging his house during an
official reprisal. Satisfied that the action was not frivolous, the
court held that "the plaintiff has a right to have his case tried so
soon as a state of war no longer prevails., 272 As with the other
challenges pressing the judiciary during the war-the loss of
criminal cases to magistrates' courts, the exclusion of enemy
aliens from civil justice, and the encroachment of administrative
268 DICEY, supra note 189, at 185.
269 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 241 (K.B.).
270 Id. at 269. He also proclaimed in R. v. Strickland ex parte Ronayne:
When the state of war is over, the acts of the military during the war,
unless protected by an Act of Indemnity, can be challenged before a jury;
and in that event even the King's command would not be an answer if the
jury were satisfied that the acts complained of were not justified by the
circumstances then existing and the necessities of the case.
[1921] 2. Ir. R. 333, 334; see Johnstone v. O'Sullivan, [1923] 2 Ir. R. 13, 30 (C.A.).
271 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 386 (K.B.).
272 Id. at 387. Heddon v. Evans, (1919) 35 T.L.R. 642 (K.B.), upheld a right to
bring a civil suit for damages against a court-martial for assault, false imprisonment,
or other common law wrong, even if committed in the course of military discipline.
The case established the right of a soldier to seek the protection of the civil courts
against officers acting outside their jurisdiction either individually or as members of
a court-martial. The holding applied also to civilians court-martialled under DORA
or ROIA. See RICHARD O'SULLIVAN, MILITARY LAW AND THE SUPREMACY OF
THE CIVIL COURTS 14 (1921).
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bodies-the common law judges vigorously countered the
military threat by asserting the principle, and occasionally the
meaningful practice, of judicial review.
II
THE MORAL IDEOLOGY OF THE WARTIME JUDICIARY
The judges thus successfully preserved their institutional
power during the war. A critical question, however, was the uses
to which they directed it. During World War I the judges
exercised their authority to an identifiable moral objective: to
delineate procedural no less than substantive rights pursuant to a
pervasive moral ideology adapted to the exigencies of war.273 An
implicit but widely shared judicial framework was the distinction
between the "deserving" and the "undeserving," a Victorian
conceptual legacy that the World War I judges translated into
legal terms and modified to wartime use.2  Ardently embracing
the cause of war, they sought to embed in the law a distinctive
set of moral values that would aid in its prosecution. They
calculated a litigant's moral worth based primarily on his or her
contribution to the national struggle and allocated procedural
entitlements accordingly. Persons who breached national
security-criminal defendants charged with violating DORA,
draftees seeking exemption from military service, enemy aliens
petitioning for release from internment, and Irish patriots
rebelling against English rule-were manifestly undeserving of a
robust judicial process. In contrast, parties who advanced
English interests in prosecuting the war, including munitions
workers and aliens participating in the nation's economic life,
were perceived as worthy of procedural rights. Thus, during the
war judges determined due process rights according to a
characteristic moralism rather than neutral principles of
procedural propriety.
The judges' wartime moral ideology explains when they
reversed decisions below and when they allowed them to stand.
273 For a discussion of the judges' moral ideology as applied to the substantive
right of individual freedom, see Vorspan, supra note 3, at 329-40.
274 On the conversion of this moral framework into legal terms in the context of
popular recreation, see Rachel Vorspan, "Rational Recreation" and the Law: The
Transformation of Popular Urban Leisure in Victorian England, 45 MCGILL L.J.
891 (2000).
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Most inferior courts were not sympathetic to the parties before
them: magistrates were generally inhospitable to DORA
defendants, military courts were antagonistic to Irish rebels,
military service tribunals were antipathetic to draft avoiders, and
munitions tribunals were hostile to workers. The judges
affirmed or reversed lower court decisions depending on
whether the judgment under review conformed to their own
moral predispositions. To the extent that they acquiesced in the
rulings of magistrates, administrative tribunals, and courts-
martial, they were not "deferring" to the executive but rather
signifying their moral approval of the course that the
subordinate body had adopted. In the rare situation where their
moral posture diverged from that of the inferior court, as in the
case of workers before the munitions tribunals, the superior
court judges did not hesitate to adopt a more corrective and
interventionist stance.
The distinctive moral culture of the judiciary was particularly
evident in decisions determining the procedural rights of three
categories of litigants: criminal defendants in national security
cases, enemy aliens in internment camps, and applicants before
the administrative tribunals. These varying contexts highlight
the judges' propensity to place moral weights on the scales of
their ostensibly neutral judgments of law and assign procedural
rights based on the perceived moral status of the litigants before
them.
A. Criminal Defendants and the Constriction of Procedural
Rights
Not surprisingly, the prototypically "undeserving" litigant was
a criminal defendant charged with a national security offense. In
reviewing magistrates' decisions in DORA cases, the judges
sanctioned a continuing erosion of defendants' procedural rights
during this period.27 ' For example, the High Court ruling in
275 Magistrates were generally not hospitable to the rights of criminals. See, e.g.,
72 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) (July 1, 1915) 2079; 83 PARL. DEB., H.C. (5th ser.) at
1101, 1171 (June 29, 1916). An example of a militaristic magistrate's decision was
R. v. Cheshire, (1917) 81 J.P. 324, where the court invalidated a special set of
military service exceptions granted by government officials to men in their own
departments. Even though the Army did not object to the exemptions, the
magistrate thought it was unconstitutional for government departments to relieve
men from military service. Id. at 324; see Protection Certificates, 61 SOL. J. 732
(1917).
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Kaye v. Cole2 76 severely undermined a defendant's right to a
speedy trial. As noted, the case held that magistrates derived
their power to deal with wartime offenses exclusively from
.• 277
DORA, which placed no time limit on prosecutions. Judicial
2781
rulings in the Norman cases further limited defendants' due
process rights by approving the magistrates' common practice of
holding closed proceedings.
Driven by the precarious circumstances in Ireland and a
general overlay of ethnic hostility toward the Irish, the courts
curtailed the rights of Irish defendants even more aggressively,
whittling down procedural protections in courts-martial to the
bare minimum. In R. v. Governor of Lewes Prison ex parte
Doyle 92 7 ' a case rejecting a prisoner's request for a public trial,
the judges' disapproval of the defendant and his sympathizers
was palpable. Lord Reading declared that Doyle's supporters
might have come into court and "terrorized, possibly even 'have
shot, witnesses," 28 0 while Mr. Justice Darling proclaimed with
equal stridency that allowing people to testify publicly would
have been "grotesque., 28 1 Other decisions similarly exemplified
the courts' cursory treatment of Irish defendants' procedural
282
claims. In Whelan v. R., for example, the court undercut a
requirement intended to protect defendants by simply
presuming without further inquiry that the prosecutor had
complied with his regulatory obligation.
2813R. v. Murphy was perhaps the most egregious example of
the superior courts' disinclination to take seriously the due
process claims of Irish rebels. A ROIA court-martial tried
Murphy in December 1920 for being a member of an ambush
party that caused the death of an English soldier. Prior to the
court-martial, the Army had conducted a military inquest in
276 (1917) 115 L.T. 783 (K.B.).
277 Id. at 785. The court also found that regulations criminalizing antiwar
statements were in conformity with DORA even though they "were of a drastic
character." Id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 78-83.
278 Norman v. Matthews, [1916-17] All E.R. Rep. 696 (K.B.); Ex parte Norman,
(1916) 114 L.T. 232 (K.B.); see supra text accompanying notes 84-91.
279 [1917] 2 K.B. 254..
280 Id. at 272.
281 Id. at 274.
282 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 310 (K.B.); see supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
283 [1921] 2 Ir. R. 190 (K.B.).
, 20081
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which two soldiers gave evidence at a deposition that varied
significantly from their subsequent court-martial testimony.
Learning of the earlier testimony from a newspaper account,
Murphy's attorney requested copies of the original depositions
at the court-martial so that he could properly cross-examine the
prosecution witnesses. 2m The Judge-Advocate refused . 285  The
King's Bench conceded that the court-martial had committed an
error of law in "a matter of vital importance, 286 but it
nonetheless ruled that a court-martial did not "exceed or abuse
its jurisdiction merely because it incidentally misconstrues a
statute, or admits illegal evidence, or rejects legal evidence., 287
In the case of the Irish especially, refusal to correct error below
did not signify subservience to the government but rather the
judges' effectuation of their own moral preferences through the
agency of the inferior courts.
On procedural issues arising initially in their own courts, the
superior court judges also consistently interpreted wartime
legislation to favor the prosecution. As the King's Bench
288unabashedly remarked in Norman v. Matthews, a court could
not construe an act passed "for securing the safety of the Realm
with the same scrupulous nicety as, for instance, a taxing Act.,
28 9
This judicial perspective was evident in a number of different
284 Id. at 194.
285 Id. The Judge-Advocate relied on a rule promulgated under the Army Act,
1881, 44 & 45 Vict., c. 58, § 70, providing that testimony before an inquest was not
admissible against the accused. Though the rule was obviously intended for the
benefit of defendants, the military judge inexplicably used the provision to refuse to
provide documents to defendant's counsel. Murphy's lawyer was so outraged at this
ruling that he wrote a scathing letter to the Attorney General: "It seems almost-an
impertinence to point out to you as a lawyer the absurdity of this ruling .... Would
anyone outside a lunatic asylum rule that I could not cross-examine out of the
coroner's depositions?" Murphy, [1921] 2 Ir. R. at 192.
286 Id. at 221.
287 Id. at 226. The court maintained that all it had to deal with in the instant case
was a "misapplication of the laws of evidence," not a "refusal to hear the defence."
Id. at 228.
288 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 303 (K.B.).
289 Id. at 304. The courts also easily validated police conduct in searches and
seizures authorized by DORA. See, e.g., Ex parte Norman, (1916) 114 L.T. 232
(K.B.) (upholding the seizure of documents alleged to violate a press regulation);
Maire Nic Shiublaigh v. Love, (1919) 53 Ir. L.T.R. 137 (C.A.) (affirming that there
was an urgent necessity to enter plaintiff's premises and seize documents under
DORA Regulation 51 rather than using ordinary legal procedure under Regulation
51A).
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contexts. Regarding the burden of proof, for example, judges in
national security cases often inverted the usual rule and placed
the burden on the defendant. R. v. Denison290 considered the
case of a German subject whom the military had banished from
his home district out of suspicion that he might commit acts
harmful to public safety.291  The judge concluded that the
standard applicable to military conduct was that the officer
merely entertain an "honest" rather than a "reasonable"
suspicion. He further ruled that it was Denison's burden to
prove that the military authority did not "honestly" suspect
him. A similar requirement pertained to prosecutions under
293the Alien Restriction Act 9, where the courts concluded that
defendants bore the burden of proving that they were not
aliens.294
The courts also disadvantaged the defense in rulings on the
admissibility of evidence. Michaels v. Block295 concerned a
DORA regulation authorizing an officer to arrest without
warrant a person whose behavior gave "reasonable grounds for
suspecting" that he was dangerous to the public safety. 296 The
military authority had arrested Block pursuant to information
about his antecedents that the Chief Constable of Portsmouth
had provided. The defendant objected that the prosecution must
prove "behaviour" by the best evidence, not simply information
contained in a police dossier. In addition, he insisted that the
arresting officer must witness the suspicious conduct himself.
Mr. Justice Darling disagreed, holding that the police evidence
was admissible because "behaviour" included all acts of which
290 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 528 (K.B.).
291 Id. at 528-29.
292 Id. at 529. Similarly, in Ronnfeldt v. Phillips, [1918] W.N. 328 (C.A.), the
Army ordered a coal exporter of German parentage to leave the Cardiff area, and
the Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's ruling that Ronnfeldt had the
burden of showing that the military authority did not suspect him "honestly." Id. at
330.
293 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 12.
294 In R. v. Kakelo, [1923] 2 K.B. 793 (Ct. Crim. App.), where the defendant was
charged with making a false statement under the Act, a critical issue was whether or
not he was in fact an alien. The court held that the onus was upon the defendant to
prove that he was not. Id. at 795. Similarly, in Ex parte Weber, [1916] 1 K.B. 280
(C.A.), the court placed the burden on a habeas petitioner contesting his
internment to establish that he was not an alien. Id. at 282.
295 (1918) 34 T.L.R. 438 (K.B.).
296 DORA CONSOL. REGS., supra note 53, at Reg. 55.
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the military "may be credibly informed. 2 97  Noting that the
regulation was "part of legislation passed hurriedly while the
country [was] at war," he decided "to construe it according to
the maxim, salus populi suprema lex. ' '298  This case was
significant because it permitted arrest even where there was no
suspicion that an actual offense had been committed.299
As in Whelan v. R., which applied a common law presumption
to excuse a court-martial's failure to certify that it was validly
constituted,3 °0 judges in their own courts used presumptions to
exempt the prosecution from formal compliance with procedural
rules. R. v. Metz3°1 involved a conviction for conspiring to trade
302
with the enemy under the Trading with the Enemy Act 1914, a
statute expressly providing that after a person's arrest no further
proceedings could be taken without the consent of the Attorney
General.3 3 The prosecutor did not present formal proof of the
Attorney General's consent at the trial. Untroubled, the court
ruled that such proof would simply be presumed: there was a
broad distinction, Lord Reading intoned, between "substance
and mere technicality. ' ' 304  As will be shown, the use of the
concept of "mere technicality" also pervaded judicial decisions
on the adequacy of tribunal proceedings involving other
305categories of "undeserving" litigants:
In sum, the superior court judges permitted, and at times
instituted, serious restrictions on the procedural rights of
criminal defendants during the war. Significantly, they
supported individual rights for criminal defendants in only two
instances, the right to jury trial and the right to habeas corpus,
both contexts where affirming individual procedural rights
advanced the judges' institutional objectives. In upholding the
right to jury trial, the judges celebrated the distinctive procedure
297 Michaels, 34 T.L.R. at 438. In an action for false imprisonment, the burden of
proving the existence of reasonable and probable cause ordinarily lay on the
defendant. See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 42 n.188.
298 Michaels, 34 T.L.R. at 438.
299 See CAMPBELL, supra note 97, at 42, 114-15.
300 See supra text accompanying notes 207-08.
301 (1915) 84 L.J.K.B. 1462.
302 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 87, § 1(4).
303 Id.
304 Metz, (1915) 84 L.J.K.B. at 1464.
305 See infra Part II.C.2.
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of their own courts, and in asserting the right to challenge
detention by a writ of habeas corpus, they bolstered their own
power to oversee executive and military conduct. Moreover,
advancing these rights had only a minimal impact on the war
effort since the right to jury trial was severely circumscribed and
habeas petitions could always be denied after the court asserted
jurisdiction. In all other circumstances, the courts treated
defendants who breached national security as meriting only the
scantiest of due process protections.
B. The Dual Moral Character of Enemy Alien Detainees
The disreputable status of criminal defendants accused of
placing the state at risk was unequivocal. Enemy alien
detainees, however, presented a more nuanced situation and
elicited a more complex judicial response. If an interned enemy
alien brought a civil lawsuit to protect private commercial or
property rights, the court stripped him of his "enemy character"
and expressly declared him to be "innocent." In contrast, if he
sought release from internment through the writ of habeas
corpus, the court treated him as a morally objectionable "enemy
combatant." - Flowing from these moral calculations, in the
former situation the alien was allowed to litigate his case, while
in the latter he was thrown out of court.
A major rationale for the court's decision in Schaffenius v.
Goldberg,3 6 which allowed an enemy alien detainee to sue in
contract, was that an interned enemy was of "innocent"
character. As Mr. Justice Younger wrote, "[i]t is common
knowledge amongst us that the internment of a civilian alien
enemy does not necessarily connote any overt hostile attitude. 3°
He continued:
Many such aliens have been interned at their own request and
for their own protection; many others profess the strongest
desire to become and many more have applied to be
naturalized British subjects. And these professions may be,
and in very many cases they doubtless are, quite sincere; the
only justification in such cases for internment is that the State
cannot take the risk that they are not.
30 8
306 [1916] 1 K.B. 284; see supra text accompanying notes 28-33.




To intern a civilian, the court continued, was "a mere measure of
police-a proceeding connoting no proof of hostile act or
,,30 31'0intent. ' 09 Nordman v. Rayner, a case similarly upholding an
enemy alien's capacity to sue in contract, explicitly referred to
the internee's lack of moral culpability. The court noted that
"the internment was not due to any moral default of the
plaintiff" and therefore "could not be held to have operated to
destroy his civil rights.,
311
The moral calculus was entirely different, however, where an
enemy internee sought a writ of habeas corpus. Schaffenius and
Rayner were especially striking in light of an earlier case, R. v.
312Superintendent of Vine Street Police Station ex parte Liebmann,
which ruled that enemy aliens were not entitled to challenge
313
their internments through the writ of habeas corpus. In
Liebmann the enemy alien detainee was not morally "innocent"
and devoid of animus toward the English; on the contrary, he
was a hostile "enemy combatant" and "prisoner of war" who
posed a serious threat to national security:
This war is not being carried on by naval and military forces
only. Reports, rumours, intrigues play a large part. Methods
of communication with the enemy have been entirely altered
and largely used. I need only refer to wireless telegraphy,
signalling by lights, and the employment on a scale hitherto
309 Id. at 296.
310 (1916) 33 T.L.R. 87 (K.B.).
311 Id. at 88. The "deserving" character of the individual litigants in the civil cases
undoubtedly influenced the court in their favor. In Princess Thurn and Taxis v.
Moffitt, [1915] 1 Ch. 58, which allowed a defamation suit, the court noted that
although the plaintiff's husband was at that moment "probably engaged in fighting
against this country," id. at 60, the plaintiff herself was "an American lady" who had
involuntarily "become an alien enemy by virtue of her marriage" and was insisting
"on a right which [was] individual to herself," id. at 61. Similarly, in the divorce
case of Krauss v. Krauss, (1919) 35 T.L.R. 637 (Prob., Divorce & Adm.), the alien
plaintiff was "innocent" in that he was domiciled in England, had two children born
there, had sought to be naturalized, and whose wife had committed adultery while
he was interned and was expecting a child at the time of the lawsuit.
312 [1916] 1 K.B. 268.
313 The court based its ruling on common law precedents holding that prisoners
of war were not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus. See, e.g., R. v. Schiever, (1759) 2
Burr. 765, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B.); Case of Three Spanish Sailors, (1779) 2 Black
W. 1324, 96 Eng. Rep. 775 (K.B.); Furly v. Newnham, (1780) 2 Dougl. 419, 99 Eng.
Rep. 269 (K.B.).
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unknown of carrier pigeons. Spying has become the hall-mark
of German "kultur." 314
In these circumstances, Mr. Justice Bailhache announced, a
German civilian in the country "may be a danger in promoting
unrest, suspicion, doubts of victory, in communicating
intelligence, in assisting in the movements of submarines and
Zeppelins. ', 31 5  Rather than being an innocent civilian
preventively detained, in this context a German resident in
England presented "a far greater danger, indeed, than a German
soldier or sailor., 31 6 Another judge in the case, Mr. Justice Low,
offered a similar opinion: when dealing with an enemy for whom
"the acceptance of hospitality connotes no obligation" and "no
blow can be foul," it would be idle to wait for evidence of an
overt act or "evil intent.,
317
The Court of Appeal in Schaffenius recognized and resolved
the dilemma created by Liebmann by limiting that ruling to the
context of habeas corpus petitions. As the Master of the Rolls
pronounced, the habeas issue was "all that that case decided";
318
the right to petition for a writ was "a very different question,
319
from the right to bring a civil suit. To expand Liebmann and
treat an interned German as losing "civil rights in respect of a
lawful contract, 320 would "be an extension of the law which I
cannot in any way countenance., 32' Another appellate judge,
Lord Warrington, agreed that it would be "extravagant" to say
that internment deprived a plaintiff of his civil rights, as that
would imply "that the first man who came along might go and
live in his house and.., take possession of his property and deal
with it as he pleased., 322  Thus, for purposes of enforcing
314 Liebmann, [1916] 1 K.B. at 275.
315 Id.
316 Id.
317 Id. at 278. Moreover, as the court insisted in another habeas case, an internee
was nothing but an alien enemy to whom a "temporary indulgence" had been
granted. R. v. Commandant exparte Forman, (1917) 87 L.J.K.B. 43, 45.
318 Schaffenius v. Goldberg, [1916] 1 K.B. 284, 301.
319 Id. at 304.
320 Id. at 302.
321 Id. at 301.
322 Id. at 304. As Lord McNair wrote in 1919, "[i]nternment merely curtails
personal liberty, and does not destroy procedural capacity, and probably not
contractual, proprietary, or testamentary capacity." Arnold D. McNair, British
Nationality and Alien Status in Time of War, 35 L.Q.R. 213, 231 (1919).
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commercial or property rights, enemy alien internees were
ordinary respectable residents. For purposes of habeas
applications, however, they were enemy combatants and
prisoners of war, as dangerous to the realm as if they "had been
captured in a German ship, or at some point in Flanders.,
323
Moral character was contextual, and different causes of action
seeking varying remedies produced divergent moral judgments
and legal results. Enemy alien internees could legitimately enjoy
the right to sue in their own economic interests, but it was
another matter entirely to grant writs of habeas corpus that
would set "dangerous" enemies at liberty.
C. "Deserving" and "Undeserving" Litigants Before the
Administrative Tribunals
The judges further effectuated their moral ideology by
determining due process rights in the administrative tribunals
according to the perceived moral worth of the applicant.
Munitions workers, who were essential participants in the
national enterprise of winning the war, enjoyed an entirely
different moral status than the obvious "cowards" requesting
exemption from military service. The courts intervened to
secure procedural protections for the former, but they permitted
the tribunals to treat the procedural rights of "undeserving"
draft resisters as mere formalities that could readily be
discarded.
1. Workers Pursuing Redress Before the Munitions Tribunals
In guiding the tribunals on the appropriate construction of the
Munitions Acts, the High Court generally showed
evenhandedness and even solicitude for workers. For example,
it interpreted provisions of the Act in employees' favor in regard
to labor mobility, often supporting workers' applications for
-leaving certificates. This approach was evident in Bennett v.
323 Schaffenius, [1916] 1 K.B. at 301 (per Lord Cozens-Hardy, M.R.). Later in the
war Lord Atkinson in the House of Lords embraced the moral perspective of
Schaffenius, stating in Johnstone v. Pedlar, [1921] 2 A.C. 262, 285 (H.L.(I.)), that
internment was a "measure of precaution" rather than a "punishment for crime that
had been committed." Such innocent internment did not affect an alien's civil
rights, in this case the right to sue the Crown to retrieve money confiscated from
him upon his arrest. Id. at 286.
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King's Norton Metal Co., 24 where a firm had closed for five days
to take inventory and perform repairs. A provision in the 1916
Act required the employer to grant a leaving certificate if the
worker had no opportunity to earn wages for more than two
325days. Mr. Justice Atkin held that even when a factory closed
for good reason, the worker had no such opportunity and was
entitled to a leaving certificate. The court went even further in
Taylor v. Samuel Osborn & Co.,326 where the company had
declared a holiday for ten days while it made repairs to a faulty
engine. Employees of the company applied for leaving
certificates, and the firm offered them temporary employment at
a lower rate of pay than the standard district rate. The tribunal
concluded that it was customary to excuse an employer from
providing work if a closure was for good cause, and it further
pointed out that the firm in any event had offered the men jobs
327
as general laborers at "reasonable" wages. On appeal,
however, the High Court reversed the tribunal and granted the
employees the requested leaving certificates. Mr. Justice Atkin
reasoned that the statutory phrase "no opportunity of earning
wages" must be read to mean no opportunity to earn "such
wages as he might earn in his ordinary employment., 328 It did
not, the judge warned, mean the opportunity to earn "any"
329
wages or even "reasonable" wages.
The judges also granted certificates in situations where
workers, especially apprentices, wanted to seek better-paying
employment. In Donaldson v. H.W. Kearns & Co. 3 3 0 the High
Court allowed an apprentice to leave his job for a position
paying full wages because, in its view, the object of the statute
324 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 114.
325 Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916,5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 5(2).
326 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 163.
327 Id. at 164.
328 Id. at 165.
329 Id. In Acme Steel & Foundry Co. v. Stafford, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 53,
54, Lord Dewar held that workmen were entitled to a leaving certificate where
employers closed their works for more than two days for repairs. He noted that
paying wages during repairs might be hard on an employer but "would be even
harder on a workman-who may have no resources beyond his daily wage." Id. at
54; see Dodds v. J.L. Thompson & Son, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 63 (finding
workers were entitled to leaving certificates when a firm closed down because of
bad weather).
330 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 143.
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was to "give this advantage to a workman. ' ' 331  Mr. Justice
Atkin's encouraging attitude toward worker ambitions was again
on display in MacDougall v. Wallsend Slipway & Engineering
Co.,332 where he set forth important considerations that he hoped
the tribunals would always bear in mind: that it was "desirable
not to keep workmen down," and that tribunals should "give
workmen who show a special skill in their trade free scope to rise
to higher positions., 333  The High Court also issued decisions33 335
favorable to workers on wages,334 work rules, and notice
336
requirements for discharging employees.
331 Id. at 147.
332 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 27.
333 Id. at 29; see, e.g., Gane v. Rees Roturbo Mfg. Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep.
129 (ruling that employers could not give out leaving certificates containing
negative comments about the men's conduct); Padgett v. Richard Hornsby & Sons,
Ltd., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 137 (concluding that an apprenticeship agreement
could not outweigh the desire of a young worker to leave his work to obtain the
standard rate of wages); Scottish Iron & Steel Co. v. Hands, (1916) Scot. Mun. App.
Rep. 1 (ruling that a man employed intermittently was entitled to a leaving
certificate to obtain regular work elsewhere); Merry & Cuninghame v. Paterson,
(1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 28, 36 (holding that an employer who imposed a
forced holiday on his workmen "in the face of a protest from the whole body of his
workmen" was required to give leaving certificates); Cook v. Haslam Foundry &
Eng'g Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 8 (allowing a worker to transfer to another
employment to earn overtime wages).
334 See, e.g., Collins v. Brazil, Straker & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 27; Taylor
v. Samuel Osborn & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 163; Morris v. Rudge-
Whitworth, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 107; Padgett v. Richard Hornsby & Sons,
Ltd., (1917) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 137; Boyd v. Climie, (1917) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 75;
Scott v. MacLellan & Co., (1918) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 134.
335 See, e.g., Gloucester Ry. Carriage & Wagon Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 81
(holding that a worker did not breach work rules by being absent from work on
Sunday); John I. Thornycroft & Co., v. Stonehouse, (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 166
(same regarding leaving early on Sunday); Nat'l Projectile Factory v. Fagan, (1917)
2 Mun. App. Rep. 75 (ruling that an employer could not unilaterally substitute piece
work for time work).
336 The Munitions of War (Amendment) Act, 1916, 5 & 6 Geo. 5, c. 99, § 5(3),
provided that where a workman was dismissed without notice, the tribunal could
award him compensation not exceeding five pounds. The Munitions of War Act,
1917, 7 & 8 Geo. 5, c. 45, § 3(1), changed the compensation rule to a liquidated
damages clause, providing that a worker's contract could not be terminated except
by a week's notice or wages in lieu of notice. For judicial interpretations of these
provisions favorable to employees, see Rawnsley v. Bradford Dyers Assoc., Ltd.,
(1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 103; Foden v. Jacquet-Maurel & Condac, Ltd., (1916) 1
Mun. App. Rep. 237; Holes v. Day, Summers & Co., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 17;
Mallon v. Harland & Wolff, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 1; Fairchild v. Heenan &
Froude, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 61; Lane v. Chief Superintendent of
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In addition to supporting individual workers, the High Court
judges also decided cases in favor of unions, holding that yellow-
dog contracts were invalid and that strikes did not necessarily
breach the employment contract. An illustrative case was
George v. Larne Shipbuilding Co.,337 where Mr. Justice Pim
reversed a tribunal decision finding that workers who protested
an employer's unilateral change in start time engaged in an
unlawful strike. "I cannot hold," he declared, "that men are
guilty of having taken part in a strike, technical or otherwise, if
the employer is wrongfully attempting to vary the contract of
employment.,
338
Employees prevailed before the High Court on procedural
issues as well. Whereas in the military service cases, as will be
shown, the judges eschewed legal technicalities only to benefit
the Army, in the munitions context they lessened procedural
burdens on the employee. G. Inglis & Co. v. Walker,339 a
particularly important case, held that a worker was not required
to make a formal statement of his claim in order to obtain relief.
As Lord Dewar observed, a worker could not "be expected to
present his case with legal precision" ;34 it was sufficient if he
lodged a general complaint without stating precise grounds.341
Similarly, in Swales v. Great Eastern Railway Co.,342 Mr. Justice
Atkin expressed his displeasure with a tribunal's rejection of a
worker's claim on the ground of res judicata. It was simply not
Ordnance Factories, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 117; Knight v. Navy & Army
Canteen Board, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 139.
337 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 82.
338 Id. at 90-91; see, e.g., Guillet v. E.H. Bentall & Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep.
86 (invalidating a company policy requiring every employee to sign an agreement
not to join a union); Stierlin v. Gen. Stores & Munitions Co., (1916) 1 Mun. App.
Rep. 124 (holding that a strike did not ipso facto terminate the men's employment
and that workers were therefore entitled to leaving certificates); Morris v. Rudge-
Whitworth, Ltd., (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 107 (upholding a union official's claim
that an employer had unlawfully changed the wage rate without the consent of the
Minister of Munitions); Amalgamated Soc'y of Carpenters & Joiners v. Ramage,
(1917) Scot. App. Rep. 71 (reversing a tribunal finding and upholding a union claim
that workers were entitled to compensation under the Act).
339 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 10; see Maclean v. Yarrow & Co., (1916) Scot.
Mun. App. Rep. 5 (upholding workers' claims as timely on the ground that an
employee was entitled to receive notice of the ground for dismissal in writing before
he was required to lodge his claim).
340 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. at 12.
341 Id.
342 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 189.
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wise, the judge cautioned, to introduce into a statute providing
relief for workers "all the technical rules relating to causes of
action., 343 The High Court also assisted employees by relaxing
rules in evidentiary matters. In Scottish Tube Co. v.
M'Gillivray,3 4 where the employers protested that procedures in
tribunal hearings were too informal, Lord Dewar concluded that
sworn and elaborate testimony was inappropriate in cases
involving leaving certificates. Munitions tribunals were
"emergency Courts" that had to "administer justice in very
difficult circumstances, and with all possible speed.,
345
Although the courts approved informality to benefit the
worker, they forced employers to comply rigidly with procedural
requirements. While G. Inglis v. Walker allowed and indeed
encouraged employees to submit an informal complaint, Shelton
Iron, Steel & Coal Co. v. Hassal1346 denied employers that same
right. In Shelton, a munitions firm complained to the local
tribunal that a worker had refused to follow a work instruction.
The tribunal found the worker guilty of both failing to work
diligently and defying a lawful order. On appeal to the High
Court, the employee argued that he had not received notice that
he was being charged with two different offenses on the same
facts. Siding with the company, the Minister of Munitions relied
on G. Inglis to argue that. a written complaint was the only
requisite formality. Mr. Justice Atkin conceded that the rules
for munitions tribunals did not require a detailed complaint if
"read strictly,, 347 and he further agreed that the whole procedure
was devised to avoid technicality.348 Nonetheless, in his view it
was essential that the worker know the ground of the employer's
chafrge so he could determine "what his rights really are.,
349
Regardless of express requirements in the statute or regulations,
343 Id. at 196. The court concluded, however, that the chairman of the tribunal
was "substantially correct" in rejecting the application for a leaving certificate, as
the case had already been decided on exactly the same materials. Id.
344 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 16.
345 Id. at 17; see Colley v. Minister of Munitions, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 21
(hearing a worker's appeal though the worker had pled guilty and technically had
no right of appeal).
346 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 208.
347 Id. at 216.
348 Id.
349 Id. at 217.
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the judge cautioned, general propositions "inherent in the
administration of criminal justice, 35° were applicable to
munitions proceedings. Requiring the employer to specify the
precise nature of the charge was not a "mere technicality" but
rather a matter that "ought to be attended to if justice is to be
done between man and man before the tribunal., 351 The court
thus went beyond the applicable statute and rules to grant
workers extra protections based on fundamental principles of
fairness.
The judges supported a worker's procedural rights not only
with respect to bringing a complaint but also with regard to the
hearing process. The High Court insisted that a tribunal must
give an employee a full opportunity to present his case, ruling in
Kinder v. Delta Metal Co. 352 that a failure to do so "would
amount to a denial of justice. 353  In contrast, Thompson v.
Toolmakers & Light Machinery, Ltd.354 limited the employer's
right to state his case to a single presentation. Here, a worker
claimed compensation for dismissal, and his employers in turn
charged him with misconduct. As the rules permitted, they
submitted their evidence by letter rather than in person.355
When the tribunal decided in favor of the employee, the
employers asked to present evidence before the High Court.
Mr. Justice Atkin rejected their request on the ground that an
employer was expected to support a charge of misconduct by
"evidence capable of being tested., 35 6 If he failed to do so for
any reason, the employer could not expect the court to "give him
facilities for further litigating the question of fact., 357 Along the
350 Id. at 219.
351 Id.
352 (1916) 1 Mun. App. Rep. 46.
353 Id. at 52.
354 (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. 145.
355 TRIBUNAL RULES, supra note 110, R. 12(b).
356 Thompson, (1917) 2 Mun. App. Rep. at 147.
357 Id. In Scottish Iron & Steel Co. v. Hands, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 1, the
court again held that the employers were not permitted to offer further proof when
they failed to do so below: "This Court has wide powers, and may call for inquiry at
any stage; but that is a power which ought to be exercised with discrimination." Id.
at 3; see Ritchie, Graham & Milne v. Dougan, (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 8
(holding that a statement in writing rather than a personal appearance was not
sufficient to support an employer's charge of misconduct).
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same lines, the court in Robinson & Co. v. Kerr358 rejected an
employer's request to submit additional evidence. Observing
that a party must attend punctually in his own interest, the court
refused to excuse the employer's failure to appear in person due
to alleged pressures of work. G. Inglis & Co. v. Walker359 went
even further, precluding an employer from presenting additional
evidence even though the vagueness of the worker's complaint
had misled him as to the nature of the charge. The High Court
thus systematically molded procedures in the munitions tribunals
to ensure a full judicial process for workers rendering patriotic
service to the state, while at the same time demanding that
employers comply with every procedural technicality.
2. Draftees Seeking Exemption from Military Service Tribunals
In striking contrast to the solicitude they displayed for
munitions workers, the High Court judges exhibited unrelenting
antagonism toward draftees seeking to quash a conscription
order, and their antipathy permeated judicial decisions on both
substance and procedure. As noted, R. v. Central Tribunal ex
parte Parton,360  the controversial decision holding that
conscientious objectors were not entitled to absolute exemption,
revealed the court's obvious repugnance toward applicants for
exemption. During oral argument Mr. Justice Darling suggested
that Parton had "the same objection to saving life as to taking
it,'361 since protection for life and property "finally depends on
force., 362 Mincing no words, the judge lectured the courtroom
that Parton "ought really to be an outlaw, ought he not?,
363
Parton seems to have aroused particular judicial disdain because
he was financially dependent on his father, the managing
director of a munitions factory.364 From a moral perspective, the
substantive result in the case was entirely predictable.
358 (1917) Scot. Mun App. Rep. 81.
359 (1916) Scot. Mun. App. Rep. 10.
360 (1916) 32 T.L.R. 476 (K.B.).
361 Id. at 476.
362 Id.
363 Id.
364 Id. The Appeal Tribunal judges had reasoned that since Parton's income
partly derived from the manufacture of munitions, he should not be exempted from
noncombatant service. Id.
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Parton also lost on his procedural claim that the Central
Tribunal was obliged to hear him in person,365 and virtually every
other applicant for a military service exemption suffered the
same fate at the hands of the High Court. Repeatedly, the
judges excused the Army from strict compliance with procedures
mandated by statute or regulation. In R. v. Lincolnshire Appeal
Tribunal ex parte Stubbins,36 for example, both the King's Bench
and the Court of Appeal held that the military representative
need not satisfy notice requirements with rigor. Stubbins, the
applicant, had received an award of total exemption from his
local tribunal but lost it in the Appeal Tribunal. He complained
to the High Court that he had not received proper notice of the
military representative's appeal. In rejecting his claim, the court
may well have been influenced by the applicant's particularly
unattractive character. A bachelor, Stubbins cited virtually
every available ground to obtain an exemption;367 even more
damaging, he was the chairman of his local tribunal and had
368presided over the session that considered his own application.
This behavior hardly endeared him to the High Court, which
observed that it would have been "more in accordance with the
spirit in which justice is administered in this country" if he had
not presided that day.
369
Deciding in favor of the military representative, the court held
that giving notice to the applicant in the prescribed form was not
required.370 Eschewing "slavish adherence to the exact words,
37 1
of a regulation, Lord Reading declared that "it is not necessary
to comply with the letter when there is a compliance with the
spirit of the regulation., 372  On appeal, the Court of Appeal
agreed that the rules were "directory" rather than
365 Id. at 477; see supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
366 [1917] 1 K.B. 1 (C.A.).
367 Stubbins argued that he was engaged in work of 'national importance, suffered
from ill-health, worked in an exempt occupation, and had financial and domestic
obligations. Id. at 3.
368 When the tribunal reached his own application, Stubbins stood alongside the
new chairman while the tribunal decided the case. Hardly surprisingly, the tribunal
granted him a certificate of total exemption. Id.
369 Id. at 7. The court observed that his behavior had given "colour to suggestion
that the tribunal was influenced by his presence on the bench." Id.
370 Id. at 9.
371 Id. at 10.
372 Id. at 9.
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"imperative." 373 The regulations, which allowed a party to bring
an appeal in a particular manner, did "not provide that it shall
not be brought in any other manner.,374
In other cases as well, the common law courts smoothed the
Army's procedural path in taking an appeal from an adverse
tribunal decision. For example, when an applicant contested an
order reducing his period of exemption on the ground that the
military representative had not given him the required notice of
appeal, the court simply concluded that providing notice was not
a condition precedent to considering the appeal.375  The
regulations could not be "disregarded and treated as useless,"
the judge conceded, but they were only intended to "serve as a
guide., 376  Another High Court ruling gave the Army an
additional opportunity to appeal to the Central Tribunal even
though the Appeal Tribunal had already rejected the
representative's request in open court and awarded the applicant
his exemption. In contrast, when the applicant for exemption
sought a right to appeal, as in R. v. County of London Appeal
378Tribunal ex parte Febbutt Bros. , the court quickly dismissed his
claim. Observing that an appeal to the Central Tribunal was a
matter solely within the Appeal Tribunal's discretion, the court
declined to issue a writ of mandamus even to correct an
erroneous decision.379
373 Id. at 15.
374 Id. at 14.
375 R. v. Leicestershire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Tivey, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 807.
376 Id. at 809.
377 R. v. Cent. Tribunal ex parte Syddall, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 1483. The tribunal
had followed its oral rejection of the military representative's request to appeal with
a later written decision granting it. The court reasoned that the later written
4ecision was more "formal" than the oral courtroom decision and thus superseded
it. Id. at 1485. Where it benefitted the military representative, apparently, more
formality was required. The court noted that the fact that the applicant had already
received his exemption might have been an "irregularity," but it did not affect the
matter. Id. In another case, R. v. Yorkshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Barker,
(1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 599, the tribunal admitted that it had granted the applicant leave
to appeal to the Central Tribunal "to get rid of him." Id. at 600. The court,
suggesting that tribunal members "would have done better to have kept [the
reason] to themselves," id., let the appeal stand but refused to grant the applicant
costs. As it observed with disapproval, "[t]he whole matter does not justify him in
coming to this Court and setting its machinery in motion." Id.
378 (1917) 52 L.J. 62 (K.B.).
379 Id. at 62.
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The courts excused the military representative from
compliance with formal requirements in other aspects of the
tribunal process as well. Unlike in munitions tribunals cases,
where the High Court placed a burden on the employer to
• • 380
explain the ground of his or her opposition, in draft exemption
cases it imposed no such obligation on the military
representative. In R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte
Thatcher,38 ' for example, the court merely observed that when
the applicant learned that "his claim for absolute exemption was
coming on," he had received notice of "all that they were
required to give., 382 Nor, as the court concluded in another383
case, did the failure of the military representative to contest an
exemption preclude the tribunal from acting adversely to the
applicant. The King's Bench ruled that although the regulations
prescribed a procedure for raising an objection, the military
representative's failure to follow that procedure was of no
384
consequence.
The courts' procedural bias against applicants for military
exemption was equally apparent in judicial rulings on the
requisite evidentiary process at a tribunal hearing. The Army, it
appeared, could prevail without providing any evidence at all. In385
R. v. Cardiff Local Tribunal ex parte Granger, the court
approved withdrawal of an exemption for essential employment
even though the military representative had not proven that the
applicant would better serve the national interest by joining the
Army. The judge acknowledged that the regulations required
the military representative to satisfy the military tribunal of this
fact, but it interpreted the regulation not to "require that there
should be any evidence adduced., 38 6  Conversely, the courts
380 See supra text accompanying notes 346-51.
381 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 121.
382 Id. at 139.
383 R. v. Grimsby Appeal Tribunal exparte Daley, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 1253.
384 See R. v. Hampshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte Handley, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B.
1463 (ruling that the military representative's failure to give the applicant notice of
his objection to an exemption did not compel a tribunal to grant the exemption).
385 (1918) 34 T.L.R. 553.
386 Id. at 554. Similarly, in R. v. Lincolnshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte East,
(1916) 86 L.J.K.B. 598, where a farmer claimed that working his farm was in the
national interest and noted that the military representative did not object or call




limited the draftee's ability to deyelop his factual and legal
arguments. In R. v. Wiltshire Appeal Tribunal ex parte
387Thatcher, the Court of Appeal allowed the tribunal to cut
short the applicant's evidentiary case. "An applicant is not
entitled to persevere for as long as he pleases, 388 the court
sternly announced, observing that tribunal members could
ascertain the facts by drawing inferences from the applicant's
other statements and were not bound to hear additional
evidence.389
If the tribunal was not required to hear the whole of an
applicant's presentation of facts, neither was it obligated to hear
his entire argument on the law. In R. v. Hendon Local Tribunal
ex parte Watson,390 the draftee complained that a member of the
tribunal had been absent for part of his solicitor's argument.
The King's Bench held that although such conduct violated
military service regulations, it was a matter of "technical
infringement, 39' with which the court would not interfere. With
monotonous regularity, the judges made clear that they would
not intervene to remedy "technical infringements" of applicants'
procedural rights.
Collectively, the import of these decisions was undeniable.
Virtually without exception the judges gave the military
representative the benefit of every procedural doubt but refused
the same courtesy to the applicant. In R. v. Westminster Local
Tribunal ex parte Smart,392 for example, the King's Bench
refused to excuse an applicant's failure to show up at his hearing
even though he held an apparently reasonable belief that the
hearing had been adjourned. Such a mistake, the court
concluded, was no reason for the court to require the tribunal to
adjudicate his application. But even meticulous attention to
procedural detail did not necessarily avail the draftee, as it only
aroused judicial concern that he would manipulate procedural
devices to win an exemption. In R. v. Hertfordshire Appeal
Tribunal ex parte Hills,393 the tribunal refused to grant an
387 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 121.
388 Id. at 138.
389 Id. at 140.
390 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 1256.
391 Id. at 1256.
392 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 738.
393 (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. 584.
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exemption and subsequently denied the draftee's application for
a rehearing. When the applicant appealed to the High Court,
the King's Bench refused to hear the case. According to Lord
Reading, depriving the tribunal of the right to decide whether to
rehear a case would lead to "manifest absurdity" because there
would be no finality of decision.394 An applicant, he claimed,
could appeal repeatedly until the end of the war and would
doubtless succeed eventually in obtaining the military service
exemption that the tribunal had refused.39 5 The court reached
this decision over a strong dissent pointing out that the statute
granted applicants an unrestricted right to appeal and contained
no language whatsoever suggesting that a decision on rehearing
fell outside its broad general terms.396
The courts' tendency to discriminate between applicants
before the two types of tribunal was thus readily apparent. The
superior courts shaped the legal process in the military service
tribunals by relaxing requirements for the Army while holding
the conscript to strict compliance, but in the munitions tribunals
they promoted informality to support the worker while
tightening procedural obligations on the employer. Whereas
Thatcher excused the military representative from stating the
ground of his objection to the exemption, Shelton concluded that
a detailed statement of the employer's claim was necessary to
avoid injustice. Parton denied the applicant the right to appear
personally before the tribunal, but Kinder granted the worker a
full opportunity to present his case. And though Sydall allowed
the military representative an additional opportunity to appeal,
Febbutt Bros. summarily rejected a similar request from the
applicant. These and other divergent rulings are intelligible only
by taking into account the wartime moral framework that
informed the decisions. As in the case of superior court review
generally, courts reviewing the actions of administrative
tribunals denied procedural rights to litigants they perceived as
394 Id. at 586.
395 Id. at 587; see R. v. Essex Tribunal ex parte Pikesley, (1918) 82 J.P. 1 (C.A.)
(ruling that an application to the tribunal for a rehearing could not be granted after
a man had been called up without the consent of the Army Council).
396 Hills, (1917) 86 L.J.K.B. at 589. He agreed on the merits, however, since apart
from the question of a right to appeal, "I fail to see that the applicant makes out any
case for a rehearing." Id.; see R. v. Hull & Yorkshire Appeal Tribunal, (1917) 87




"undeserving" while according "deserving" workers a full and
fair judicial process.
CONCLUSION
The English judiciary thus played a critical role in the
transformation of British legal procedures and institutions
during World War I. Although the government initiated
wartime changes through statute and regulation, it was the
judicial response to these measures that ultimately determined
the contours of the legal process. Three particular developments
threatened to undermine the position of the traditional courts
and spurred effective judicial reaction: the loss of traditional
jurisdiction over certain parties and offenses, the appearance of
new executive bodies to adjudicate disputes regarding
conscription and labor relations, and the emergence of rival
institutions of military justice in Ireland. The judges met these
challenges by quickly asserting jurisdiction over aliens, restoring
jury trial in criminal cases, supervising the courts of summary
jurisdiction, controlling the law and procedures of the
administrative agencies, and establishing the principle of civil
supremacy over both statutory courts-martial and military
tribunals in Ireland. They brought potentially rival entities
under their control by treating all judicial bodies, whether newly
created or newly empowered, as inferior courts subject to their
oversight. Rather than marginalizing the judges, the war
impelled the superior courts to solidify and indeed amplify their
institutional position.
An equally important question, however, was the end to
which the judges directed their restored and even heightened
powers. In addition to repulsing challenges to their authority
based on institutional self-interest, they shaped the legal process
in accordance with a distinctive moral ideology. Calculating the
worth of the parties before them by employing nationalistic
wartime criteria, they rewarded munitions workers and aliens
advancing economic claims with a robust judicial process.
Conversely, they circumscribed the procedural rights of criminal
defendants, Irish rebels, draft resisters, and enemy alien
detainees who challenged their internments. Rather than being
complacent, peripheral, and subordinate to the executive, the
judges forcefully molded the legal process to promote their dual
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objectives of enhancing their own institutional power and
determining procedural rights pursuant to moralistic concepts of
individual worth.
More broadly, an exploration of judicial conduct during
World War I suggests that the conventional emphasis in
historical scholarship on the fate of individual substantive rights
such as personal liberty has obscured another important
perspective. A full historical understanding of legal
developments in wartime requires attention to changes in the
legal process-particularly shifts in the balance of institutional
powers and allocations of procedural entitlements-as well as to
formal evolution of legal doctrine. Viewing the conduct of the
English judiciary during World War I from this perspective
yields contemporary as well as historical lessons. The precise
connection between judicial power and due process rights is
indeterminate and elusive, and augmenting the power of judges
is not necessarily the solution to the erosion of individual rights
in wartime. In fact, the British experience suggests that the legal
process is intensely vulnerable to distortion by judges driven by
wartime imperatives rather than by neutral procedural
principles. Judicial power during World War I produced a legal
regime that was moralistic, selective, and discriminatory in its
distribution of procedural entitlements. Understanding the
contingent role of the judiciary during this first global conflict
may encourage the heightened vigilance necessary to secure a
fair legal process for all litigants in times of war.
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